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PLEA BARGAINING AND DISCLOSURE IN GERMANY AND
THE UNITED STATES: COMPARATIVE LESSONS

JENIA I. TURNER*

ABSTRACT

This Article analyzes recent trends in plea bargainingand disclosure of evidence in Germany and the United States. Over the last
two decades, a number of U.S. jurisdictions have adopted rules
requiringbroaderand earlierdiscovery in criminalcases. This development reflects a growing consensus that, in a system that resolves
most of its cases through guilty pleas, early and extensive disclosure
is necessary to ensure fair and informed outcomes.
The introduction of broader discovery in criminal cases in the
United States alignsAmerican rules more closely with longstanding
German rules on access to the investigative file. At the same time,
through its increasing reliance on negotiations to resolve criminal
cases, the German criminaljustice system has itself moved closer to
the U.S. model of plea-based criminaljustice. As the approachesof
the two countries to disclosure and plea bargainingconverge, it is
worth reflecting on the German experience and examining which features of the German model have proven effective and which continue
to pose challenges. The analysis of the German system offers some
generalideas on regulatingdiscovery and plea bargainingthat could
be of interest to U.S. scholarsand policymakers, even if a number of
the specific rules of German criminalproceduredo not fit within the
American adversarialtradition.
* Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law. I thank Jeff Bellin, Darryl Brown, Jackie
Ross, Meghan Ryan, John Turner, Thomas Weigend, Bettina Weisser, and participants in the
Willamette University College of Law faculty workshop and the William & Mary Law Review
Symposium on plea bargaining for invaluable comments and suggestions. I am also grateful
to Thomas Weigend for helping me organize interviews with prosecutors and defense attorneys in Cologne, Germany.
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INTRODUCTION

Guilty pleas have become the standard method of conviction in
the American criminal justice system, and the staying power of plea
bargaining is no longer in doubt. Yet even as criminal trials stand
out as anomalies, many important criminal procedure rules remain
tethered to the trial stage. The prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence
is one such rule.1 In many U.S. jurisdictions, certain evidence must
be disclosed before trial, but not necessarily before a guilty plea.2
Even certain potentially exculpatory evidence may be withheld from
defendants before they plead guilty.' The different disclosure requirements at the pre-plea and pretrial stages have been defended
on the grounds that
early disclosure is more costly and increases
4
witnesses.
risks to
1. In this Article, I use the terms "disclosure" and "discovery" interchangeably because
they are used to describe the same process. Disclosure focuses on the duties of the party turning over the evidence, while discovery focuses on the recipient of the evidence. American law
tends to prefer the term "discovery," even though the defense in criminal cases is typically not
permitted to actively conduct discovery akin to the process in civil cases. See generally Ion
Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. L.
REV. 1091, 1101 (2014). Rather, the defense receives disclosures by the prosecution, as other
common law countries more aptly describe this process. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act 2003,
c. 44, § 37 (Eng.); R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, 326-28 (Can.).
2. See, e.g., GA. CODEANN. § 17-16-4 (2010) (calling for disclosure "no later than ten days
prior to trial, or at such time as the Court orders"); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11 (disclosure motion
must be made "at least 10 days before the day fixed for trial").
3. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002). Ruiz held that the government
is not constitutionally required to disclose impeachment evidence before a guilty plea, but it
did not squarely resolve whether the government must disclose factually exculpatory evidence. See id. at 625-34. Federal circuit courts have split on this issue. Compare, e.g., Orman
v. Cain, 228 F.3d 616, 617 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Brady requires a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence for purposes of ensuring a fair trial, a concern that is absent when a defendant
waives trial and pleads guilty."), with, e.g., McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787-88 (7th
Cir. 2003) ('CThe Supreme Court's decision in Ruiz strongly suggests that a Brady-type
disclosure might be required" when the prosecution "ha[s] knowledge of a criminal defendant's
factual innocence but fail[s] to disclose such information to a defendant before he enters into
a guilty plea").
4. See, e.g., Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631-32; Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 51-52 (2015); Bennett L. Gershman, PrepleaDisclosureof Impeachment Evidence, 65
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 141, 145-46 (2012), https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites89/2012/07/Gershman-Preplea-Disclosure-65-Vand.-L.-Rev.-En-Banc-141-20121.
pdf [https://perma.cc/FY8J-KZCY]; Steven M. Goldstein et al., Response to the Majority's Report, in NYSBA TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY FINAL REPORT 76, 81 (2014); Meyn,
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While acknowledging these concerns, a number of observers have
argued that early and broad disclosure is critical to ensuring fair
and informed guilty pleas.5 Liberal pre-plea disclosure enables defense attorneys to counsel their clients more effectively, especially
when those attorneys might lack the time or resources to investigate
independently. 6 It allows defendants to make more informed decisions about pleading guilty or proceeding to trial.7 By enabling the
defense to respond to the charges early on, pre-plea discovery also
gives the prosecution a better understanding of potential weaknesses in the case before trial.8 And as both parties gain greater
clarity about the facts in a timely fashion, early discovery facilitates
a speedier resolution of the case. 9
Lawmakers across the United States are increasingly hearing
these arguments in favor of broader pre-plea discovery. High-profile
exonerations have revealed that the withholding of evidence is a
key factor contributing to wrongful convictions.1" While most of the
supra note 1, at 1127.
5. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, PleaBargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2463, 2495 (2004); R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining,Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1469-73 (2011); Daniel S.
McConkie, StructuringPre-Plea Criminal Discovery, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 13-21), http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2532568 [https://perma.ccA4TV-VKJH]; Janet Moore, Democracy and CriminalDiscoveryReform After Connick and Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1372 (2012). See generally Eleanor
Ostrow, Comment, The Case for PrepleaDisclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581 (1981) (arguing that
pre-plea disclosure is essential to fairness).
6. See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
CriminalAdjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 1585, 1624 (2005); Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too
Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in
PretrialCases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1145-46, 1152-55 (2004).
7. See Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in
Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 12, 43) (on file with author).
8. See id. at 12.
9. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting ProsecutorialDisclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 516
(2009); McConkie, supra note 5 (manuscript at 19-20); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady's Bunch of
Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1560 (2010); Turner & Redlich, supra note 7
(manuscript at 12, 43).
10. See, e.g., EMILY M. WEST, INNOCENCE PROJECT, COURT FINDINGS OF PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT CLAIMS IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AND CIVIL SUITS AMONG THE FIRST 255
DNA EXONERATION CASES 3 (2010), http://www.innocenceproject.org/files/imported/innocence_
project-pros-misconduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UY9-V8MS]; Brandon L. Garrett, Judging
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 96 (2008). The problem of wrongful convictions resulting
from withheld exculpatory evidence is not limited to the United States. For a discussion of the
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uncovered wrongful convictions followed trials, roughly 13 percent
resulted from guilty pleas.1 ' Recognizing the unfairness and unjust
outcomes that restrictive disclosure can produce, a number of U.S.
states have reformed their discovery laws over the last decade to
require earlier and more extensive disclosure by the prosecution.1"
As U.S. jurisdictions continue to debate the scope of discovery
and the effect it might have on witness safety and the efficiency of
plea bargaining, it is useful to consider how other countries have approached these issues. In this Article, I examine how Germany, a
country that requires extensive disclosure in criminal cases, has
handled some of these same questions. I also discuss how the
same problem in the English criminal justice system, see, for example, Hannah Quirk, The
Significance of Culture in Criminal ProcedureReform: Why the Revised Disclosure Scheme
Cannot Work, 10 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 42, 44 (2006); Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting
Erroneous Convictions: A Social Science Approach to Miscarriages of Justice 70 (Dec. 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), https:H/ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/241389.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QE5N-GJAN].
11. 277 of the 1748 wrongful convictions listed in the National Registry of Exoneration
involved a guilty plea. Browse Cases: Detailed List, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https:/]
www.law.umich.edu/speciallexoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx [https://perma.cc/3BJY-36YF]
(last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (filter '"Tags" column with "P" selection). Of these guilty plea cases,
at least 21 involved failure to disclosure exculpatory evidence. Id. The failure to disclose exculpatory evidence was a contributing factor in a much larger number of trial-based convictions. See id.
12. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16; N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-903 (2011); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2015); see also Baer,
supra note 4, at 22-23 (describing the trend toward requiring earlier and more extensive
disclosure by the prosecution); Brown, supra note 6, at 1622-23 (same). The Texas and North
Carolina reforms were driven in large part by notorious cases of wrongful convictions in those
states. See TEX. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1611 (2013), http://www.hro.
house.state.tx.us/pdf/ba83r/sb1611.pdf#navpanes=O [https://perma.c/32W5-5V6T]; Phillip
Bantz, Death Row Inmate's Exonerationin North CarolinaInspired Change,N.C. LAW. WKLY.,
May 3, 2013, 2013 WLNR 11476236. Reforms in other states were triggered by a more general
belief that broader discovery would make the criminal process fairer and more efficient. See,
e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1 committee cmt. to 2003 amend. ("Codification of the common practice of initial disclosure prior to or at the arraignment phase of the proceedings is intended
to facilitate effective communication and the efficient resolution of issues."); OHIO R. CRIM. P.
16 staff notes to July 1, 2010 amends. ('The purpose of the revisions to Criminal Rule 16 is
to provide for a just determination of criminal proceedings and to secure the fair, impartial,
and speedy administration of justice through the expanded scope of materials to be exchanged
between the parties."). In Ohio, at least the defense bar specifically advocated for open-file
discovery on the grounds that it would prevent wrongful convictions. See THE OHIO ASS'N
OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, BROKEN DUTY: A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE BY OHIO PROSECUTORS, at i-ii (2005), http://www.oacdl.org/awsOACDL/asset
_manager/getJdle/16884 [https://perma.cc/Y5YR-H2Q5].
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German system has integrated rules on discovery with rules on plea
bargaining.
The German approach is useful to study for several reasons. The
introduction of broader and earlier discovery in criminal cases in the
United States aligns our rules more closely with German rules on
access to the investigative file. 3 At the same time, plea bargaining
has become common practice in Germany since the 1980s, and it has
been closely regulated by courts and by statute. 14 As the approaches
of the two countries converge, it is worth reflecting on the German
experience and examining which features of the German model have
proven effective and which continue to pose challenges.
At the most general level, the German experience provides additional support for arguments that early and broad discovery
should be a central feature of a fair criminal process. German courts
and legislators have continually and unequivocally affirmed the
defendant's right to inspect the evidence early in the pretrial process, and the scope of this right has expanded over time.1 5 This
expansion has occurred without undue risks to witness safety, at
least in part because legislation has also provided for measures to
minimize the conflict between open-file discovery and witness protection.' 6 During the investigative stage, prosecutors may limit
defense access to certain evidence gathered by the authorities in
order to protect the integrity of the investigation and safety of witnesses.'" Even after the investigation is complete, prosecutors and
courts may keep certain witness identities and addresses confidential if a concrete risk from disclosure can be shown.'" American
open-file jurisdictions have adopted similar measures, but the
German model provides another reference point for jurisdictions
that are exploring how to balance witness safety and disclosure. 9
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See Brown, supra note 6, at 1624-25.
See infra Part III.
See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 50, 61, 71, 204-11 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(c) (West 2015); N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N

TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY FINAL REPORT 13-21 (2014) [hereinafter NYSBA REPORT]; SUPREME COURT OF VA., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
RULES TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 6 (2014)

[hereinafter VIRGINIA REPORT].
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The German discovery regime also suggests that open-file discovery need not undermine the efficiency of plea bargaining. The
right of German defense attorneys to inspect the entire investigative
file before plea negotiations is considered a critical guarantee of
fairness and accuracy in the bargaining process, and negotiations
2
have proceeded without concerns about the costs of such discovery. "
The idea of bargaining away the right to discovery, while increasingly common in the United States, would be incomprehensible to
German courts and practitioners.2 1 In fact, while the German criminal justice system suffers from caseload pressures that are in many
ways similar to those in our system,2 2 German law generally regulates plea bargaining more closely than does U.S. state and federal
law, and concerns about fairness and the search for truth outweigh
considerations of efficiency.2 3 As Part II discusses, the German
Criminal Procedure Code and case law impose limits on plea discounts, formally ban most charge bargains and negotiated waivers,
and demand a more probing review of the factual basis for admissions of guilt.2 4 Reviewing how these rules intersect with open-file
discovery to produce fairer dispositions in Germany could offer
additional insights for U.S. policymakers who are considering
implementing more robust regulation of plea bargaining.
The German experience offers lessons beyond the usefulness of
broad pre-plea discovery. It highlights three areas in which even the
most liberal, open-file pre-plea discovery regimes in the United
States may be failing to fulfill their potential. First, the German
model emphasizes the need for more elaborate rules on investigations-specifically, what evidence is collected and recorded in the
"file" and conveyed to the prosecution (and, thus, subsequently to
the defense). Second, it reveals the importance of guidelines requiring that investigations be complete, whenever possible, before plea
negotiations occur. And third, it highlights some of the advantages
of providing discovery to the court as well as to the parties.
20. See infra Part I.
21. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutors, in Cologne, Ger. (June 18, 2014) [hereinafter
Interview with Prosecutors] (emphasizing the unwillingness of German prosecutors to compromise the investigative process in exchange for a confession).
22. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part II.
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Some of these lessons from the German experience may appear
too foreign to our adversarial tradition to be adopted. Indeed, given
our two countries' distinct legal traditions, cultures, and institutions, wholesale transplants of German discovery or plea bargaining
regulations in a U.S. setting would not be desirable or feasible.2 5 Yet
a review of the German system remains helpful as a lens through
which to examine more carefully ideas for reform of plea bargaining
and discovery that are also independently emerging in a number of
American jurisdictions.2 6 Moreover, as the systems increasingly
converge in areas such as disclosure and plea bargaining, comparative conversations become more useful and productive.
I. DEFENSE RIGHT TO INSPECT THE INVESTIGATIVE FILE IN GERMAN
CRIMINAL CASES

Some authors have suggested that "strictly speaking, there is
no such thing as a 'disclosure process' in Germany."27 Indeed,
German codes and decisions never use the term "discovery" or "disclosure," instead referring to a right to inspect the investigative
25. Cf. Richard S. Frase, Comparative CriminalJustice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 539, 547-48 (1990) (noting that procedures that are fundamentally different
from our own are not likely to be imported successfully, but transplants that build on procedures that already exist within our system are more likely to succeed). While concerns about
transplanting foreign procedures are legitimate, a wealth of scholarship has fruitfully compared different facets of the German and U.S. criminal justice systems, at least in part with
an eye toward informing U.S. criminal procedure debates. See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN,
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 1-2 (1977); Craig M. Bradley, The ExclusionaryRule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1032-34 (1983); Markus Dirk Dubber,
American PleaBargains,German Lay Judges, and the Crisisof CriminalProcedure,49 STAN.
L. REV. 547, 591-601 (1997); Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice
as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 317, 360 (1995); Erik Luna, A Placefor Comparative CriminalProcedure, 42
BRANDEIS L.J. 277, 277 (2004). See generally FLOYD FEENEY & JOACHIM HERRMANN, ONE
CASE-Two SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF AMERICAN AND GERMAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2
(2005) (comparing the American and German criminal justice systems through a hypothetical
case study).
26. See, e.g., NYSBA REPORT, supra note 19, at 2-3; TEX. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra
note 12, at 1-4; THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: A POLICY
REVIEW 20 (2007), http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/filesllbrary/expanded
discoveryincriminalcasesapolicyreview.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW64-FCP7].
27. ALEXANDER HEINZE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND DISCLOSURE 310

(2014).
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file (Akteneinsichtsrecht).As a practical matter, however, German
rules on defense inspection of the file before trial are in many
respects similar to open-file discovery rules adopted by some
American jurisdictions over the last decade.2" In Germany, as in
open-file jurisdictions in the United States, the defense is allowed
to view and copy the entire prosecution file, with some exceptions
made to protect work product, the integrity of investigations, and
witness safety.29
The right to inspect the file under German law dates back to
1879, the year that the first German criminal procedure code came
into force.3 ° Although the early versions of the law had more significant restrictions on the right to inspect the file, these restrictions
were first narrowed in a 1964 amendment to the Code3 1 and subsequently under the influence of European Court of Human Rights
jurisprudence.3 2
Today, the defendant's right to review the investigative file is
grounded in the constitutional right to a fair hearing before a court
of law, the principle of "equality of arms," and the rule of law principle. 33 The German Constitutional Court has held that a court
decision may rest on only those facts and evidence that the defendant has had an opportunity to review and respond to; this is known
as "rechtlichesGehdr," or the fair hearing principle.34 The right to
28. Compare Part I, with infra Part IV.
29. See infra Part I.A.
30. FEENEY & HERRMANN, supra note 25, at 413, 423.
31. See id.; see also LUTZ MEYER-GOSSNER, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG, at xxxviii (48th ed.
2005).
32. See Christoph Safferling, Audiatur et alterapars-dieprozessuale Waffengleichheit
als Prozessprinzip?,Neue Zeitschrift fur Strafrecht [NStZ] 181, 181-88 (2004).
33. Werner Beulke & Tobias Witzigmann, Das Akteneinsichtsrechtdes Strafverteidigers
in Fdllender Untersuchungshaft,NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR STRAFRECHT [NStZ] 254, 254 (2011).
The right to access the file is based in part on article 103(1) of the German Constitution,
which provides that "[iln the courts every person shall be entitled to a hearing in accordance
with law." GRUNDGESETZ [GGI [BASIC LAW] art. 103(1), translationat http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch-gg/englisch gg.html [https://perma.cc/5KRT-NM84]. It is also grounded
in article 20(3), which provides that "[t]he legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice," and article 2(2), which states that
"[e]very person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall
be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law." Id. arts. 2(2), 20(3).
34. E.g., Beulke & Witzigmann, supra note 33, at 254; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] July 11, 1994, NEUEJURISTISCHEWOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 3219
(3220), 1994.
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review the file is also seen as an element of "equality of arms,"
another principle established in the jurisprudence of the German
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. 5
It helps ensure that the defense can be an adversary of equal weight
at trial and that the defendant is not a mere "object" of the proceeding but rather an active participant in it. 6 At times, disclosure is
also justified as contributing to the search for truth-another constitutionally grounded principle 3 7 -by strengthening the position of the
defense at trial. On the other hand, truthfinding may occasionally
justify restricting early disclosure in order to prevent potential
interference with the investigation by the defendant.3" Finally, some
commentators have endorsed broad disclosure as a means of expediting the proceedings by allowing a speedy clarification of the facts
and a prompt resolution of the case.39
A. Scope of Right to Inspect During the Investigative Stage
The scope of disclosure in German criminal cases is generally
very expansive, but it varies somewhat depending on the stage of
the proceedings. Although the prosecution can unilaterally restrict
access to the file in some respects during the investigative stage
35. See Safferling, supra note 32, at 181-88.
36. BJORN GERCKE ET AL., STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG 973, § 147 Rn. 1 (5th ed. 2012); Jan
Bockemhfil, Verteidigung im Ermittlungsverfahren, in HANDBUCH DES FACHANWALTS
STRAFRECHT 49, 70 (Jan Bockemfihl ed., 2000); Reinhart Michalke, Das Akteneinsichtsrecht
des Strafverteidigers-AktuelleFragestellungen,NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW]
2334, 2334 (2013); Wolfgang Wohlers & Stephan Schlegel, Zum Umfang des Rechts der
Verteidigung auf Akteneinsicht gemdss §147I StPO-Zugleich Besprechung von BGH-Urteil
vom 18.6.2009-StR 89/09 (LG Hannover), NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT [NStZ] 486,
487 (2010).
37. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2628/10, 2 BvR 2883/10, 2 BvR 2155/11, Mar. 19, 2013, http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/EntscheidungenlEN/2013/03/rs201303l9_2bvr
262810en.html [https://perma.cc/45GG-77AA] (noting the constitutional basis of the search
for truth in criminal procedure). For a discussion of the tradition within inquisitorial systems
to grant the defense access to the investigative file in the interest of promoting the search for
truth, see Mirjan Damaka, Evidentiary Barriersto Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure:A ComparativeStudy, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 533-35, 535 n.64 (1973).
38. See Bockemiihl, supra note 36, at 73 (citing BVerfG StV 1994, 465, 466).
39. See id.; see also Helmut Schifer, Die Grenzen des Rechts auf Akteneinsicht durch den
Verteidiger, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT [NStZ] 203, 205 (1984) (arguing that the
prosecution should provide disclosure to the defense at the earliest opportunity in order to
avoid delays in the case).
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(Ermittlungsverfahren),such restrictions must be lifted as soon as
the prosecution has completed the investigation and is ready to file
an indictment with the court.4" To understand the timing of
disclosure, it is useful first to outline the key stages of German
criminal proceedings.
During the investigative stage police formally gather evidence
under the guidance of the prosecution.4 ' At this point in the process,
defense attorneys can review all the evidence gathered by the police
and the prosecution, unless, as discussed later, the prosecution restricts disclosure on specified grounds.4 2 In fact, reviewing the file
is frequently the principal activity of defense counsel during the
investigative stage.43 While defense attorneys can also investigate
the case independently before trial, they rarely do so." Several factors explain the relative passivity of defense attorneys during the
investigative stage: lack of time and money,4 5 concern about being
accused of "interfering" with witnesses,4 6 and the possibility of asking the court to gather additional evidence after the opening of the
40. See infra notes 48-65 and accompanying text.
41. In practice, prosecutors guide the investigation primarily in its later stages, for example, by suggesting additional measures for the police to take. See, e.g., CLAUS ROXIN &
BERND SCHJNEMANN, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT § 9, Rn. 21 (28th ed. 2014). Prosecutors also
guide the investigations more extensively in complex white-collar or organized crime cases.
See id. But in ordinary cases, police conduct investigations largely on their own initiative and
turn over the file to the prosecution when the investigation is largely complete. See id.
42. Defendants who are unable to afford an attorney may have an attorney appointed
during the investigative stage if the assistance of defense counsel would be necessary later
in the process (for example, if the case is a felony or pursuant to section 140(1) or 140(2), or
if a defense attorney would be necessary to review the file during the investigative stage). See
GERCKE ET AL., supra note 36, § 141, at 938-39; STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF
CRIMINALPROCEDURE], § 141(1), (3), translationat http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch
_stpo/german-code_of_criminalprocedure.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACY5-FNWY].
43. While reviewing the file is one of the most important tasks that defense counsel
perform at this stage, other key functions include submitting a statement in response to the
charges and the evidence in the file and representing the client at detention hearings. See
StPO §§ 136, 163a; Bockemiihl, supra note 36, at 67.
44. See Bockemiihl, supra note 36, at 76 (noting that defense attorneys must check out
potential defense witnesses at this stage to ensure that these witnesses would be favorable
to the defense, but acknowledging that such investigations are still relatively rare); see also
MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 67-68 (2012).
45. See BOHLANDER, supra note 44, at 68; Bockemihl, supra note 36, at 76.
46. Thomas Weigend & Franz Salditt, The Investigative Stage of the CriminalProcess in
Germany, in SUSPECTS IN EUROPE: PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT THE INVESTIGATIVE STAGE OF THE

CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 79, 91 (Ed Cape et al. eds., 2007); see also
Bockemiuhl, supra note 36, at 76.
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main proceedings. 47 The availability of the investigative file early in
the process may itself contribute to defense passivity.
While the defense attorney is generally entitled to see the entire
investigative file during the investigative stage, the law allows the
prosecutor to limit access in certain specified circumstances. First,
the prosecution need not share work product, such as internal memos interpreting the law or evidence in the case, because these types
of documents are not considered part of the "file."4 Second, the use
and identity of undercover agents can be kept confidential during
the investigative stage. 49 Likewise, prosecutors may withhold the
names and addresses of endangered witnesses, though this is rarely
done in practice.5" Lastly, prosecutors may deny access to portions
of the file if disclosure would jeopardize ongoing investigations.5 1
This restriction must be based on concrete evidence of the potential
danger to the investigation-for example, that the defendant (who
has access to the file through his lawyer5 2 ) would seek to destroy
evidence, interfere with investigative measures, or influence witnesses. 53 But the prosecutor's decision to withhold access to portions

47. See Weigend & Salditt, supra note 46, at 91. Regardless of whether the defense conducts its own investigations, it may also request the prosecution to gather certain exculpatory
evidence during the investigative stage, and the prosecution will generally comply so long as
it considers the evidence relevant. See StPO § 163a(2). On the other hand, the defense may
refrain from requesting such assistance from the prosecution if it is uncertain whether the
investigation would yield results favorable to the defendant. See Bockemuhl, supra note 36,
at 75 (noting that such requests may backfire against the defense).
48. The file comprises only what has to be transmitted to the court, upon the filing of the
charges at a later stage in the proceedings. See StPO § 147(1). For a discussion of the work
product exception to disclosure, see, for example, Wessing, Beck'scher Online-Kommentar
StPO § 147, Rn. 15; Wohlers & Schlegel, supra note 36, at 489; Michalke, supra note 36, at
2335; see also SHAWN MARIE BOYNE, THE GERMAN PROSECUTION SERVICE: GUARDIANS OF THE
LAW? 82 (2014).
49. StPO § 96; ULRICH SOMMER, EFFEKTIvE STRAFVERTEIDIGUNG 149 (2011); Hegmann,
Beck'scher Online-Kommentar StPO § llob, Rn. 10; see also BOHLANDER, supra note 44, at
92.
50. StPO §§ 68 (2)-(3), 200. On the relative rarity of such protections, see Interview with
Prosecutors, supra note 21 (noting that while witness addresses are more commonly withheld,
keeping the identity of witnesses confidential requires the approval of a supervisor and is rare
in practice).
51. StPO § 147(2).
52. On the scope of this access, see infra Part I.D.
53. See, e.g., SOMMER, supra note 49, at 140-41; Wessing, supra note 48, § 147 Rn. 5a.
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of the file at the investigative stage is unreviewable if the defendant
is at liberty.5 4
The restriction on grounds of risk to the investigation can only be
justified on a temporary basis. 5 Once the danger passes, the prosecutor must inform the defense that the relevant portion of the file
is now available for inspection. 6 For example, if the concern in
question is that the defendant might find out about an upcoming
search, access to the file must be granted once the search has been
conducted.5 7 In practice, prosecutors rarely withhold significant
portions of the file from the defense during the investigative stage.5 8
The most common reason for withholding appears to be that there
is a pending investigative measure (for example, a search, wiretapping, or arrest) that must remain a surprise to the defendant or his
associates in order to succeed.59 In organized crime and trafficking
cases, the identities of undercover agents are also frequently suppressed during the investigative stage." On the other hand, witness
identities are rarely kept confidential.
While the above limitations can be applied to some of the
evidence in the investigative file, three "privileged" categories of
documents-the defendant's statements, documents laying out the
results of proceedings that the defense attorney has the right to
54. StPO § 147(5). For rules with respect to defendants in pretrial detention, see infra
notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
55. StPO § 147(6).
56. Id.; GERCKE ETAL., supra note 36, § 147 Rn. 14, at 979.
57. See Interview with Prosecutors, supra note 21. Again, however, the prosecutor's
decision to restrict access to the file on such grounds is not subject to review by the court,
unless the defendant is detained. Bockemiihl, supranote 36, at 73-74.
58. See, e.g., FEENEY & HERRMANN, supra note 25, at 254; Interview with Prosecutors,
supra note 21 (estimating that in sexual assault cases, disclosure is restricted to some degree
in less than 5 percent of cases); Interview with Prof. Dr. Ulrich Sommer & Karoline Tharra,
Defense Attorneys, in Cologne, Ger. (June 18, 2014) [hereinafter Interview with Sommer &
Tharra] (noting that disclosure is rarely restricted, although it is typically restricted in cases
where a search or seizure might be frustrated by disclosure; observing that disclosure is frequently delayed, but never past the point of the filing of charges).
59. See Interview with Prosecutors, supra note 21.
60. Undercover agents are typically not identified in the file at all, although the fact that
an undercover agent has been used must be noted. See, e.g., SOMMER, supranote 49, at 149.
As Part I.B discusses, the identities of undercover agents may be withheld from the defense
even during the trial, and the agent's police handlers would be allowed to testify in place of
the agent. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. Confrontation rights in this area are
weaker in Germany than in the United States.
61. Interview with Prosecutors, supra note 21.
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attend, and expert reports--cannot be withheld from the defendant
under any circumstances. Likewise, if a defendant is detained, the
attorney has an unconditional right to inspect any evidence material to the court's decision on detention.6 3 Defendants can seek judicial
review of the prosecutor's refusal to disclose any of these "privileged" materials.6 4
B. Scope of Right to Inspect After ChargesAre Filed
Once the prosecution concludes that it has sufficient evidence to
proceed with the case to trial, it records the end of the investigation
in the file and soon thereafter files formal charges with the court.6 5
The decision to file charges typically occurs at a later stage of the
investigation than in the United States and is therefore based on
a more thorough inquiry into the facts. 6 Once the charges are
filed, the court will review them, together with the evidence in the
file, and will decide whether sufficient evidence exists to confirm
the charges and open the main proceedings.6 7 Depending on the
62. StPO § 147(3). Investigative measures that the defense attorney is permitted to attend

include the interrogation of the defendant by a prosecutor or investigative judge and a detention hearing.
63. Id. § 147(2); BVerfG, NJW 3219 (3220-21), Nov. 7, 1994. Courts and commentators
have disagreed on what constitutes evidence that is "material" to detention. A key open
question is whether the prosecutor must provide access to only incriminating evidence or also
potentially exculpatory evidence relevant to the question of detention. See Beulke &
Witzigmann, supra note 33, at 254-59; Michalke, supra note 36, at 2335. If the evidence is
material to detention, and yet the prosecution has falled to grant access to the file, the court
may not rely on any of the undisclosed evidence to support a decision to detain. BVerfG, NJW
3219 (3220-21), Nov. 7, 1994.
64. StPO § 147(5); see also SOMMER, supra note 49, at 145.
65. StPO §§ 169a, 170.
66. In the United States, prosecutors feel pressure to file charges within forty-eight hours
of the suspect's detention in order to prevent the suspect's release from custody. By contrast,
in Germany, the court does not need an initial charge document to decide on detention-the
investigative file is sufficient. Therefore, German prosecutors have more time to prepare a
charging document. Because the expectation is that the charging document will be more
detailed and that the investigative stage will be complete by the time prosecutors file charges,
the filing of formal charges tends to occur later in the process in Germany than it does in the
United States. See, e.g., FEENEY & HERRMANN, supra note 25, at 29-30, 34, 373; cf.
BOHLANDER, supranote 44, at 68 (making a similar comparison between the timing of charges
in Germany and in England).
67. The court may decide to conduct a supplementary investigation before deciding
whether to confirm the charges. See StPO § 202. The defendant may also request that evidence be taken on his behalf and may file objections to the admission of the indictment. See
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complexity of the case and the schedule of the court, the period between the filing of the charges and the start of the main proceedings
may last several months.6 8 During that time, both the court and the
defense have full access to the investigative file.69
Even if defense attorneys were granted access to the file early in
the proceedings, they typically demand to consult the file again once
it has been passed on to the court because they may then find information that had previously been unavailable to them.7" The only
items that may be withheld at this point are work product and, in
cases in which witness safety might be a concern, the addresses
(and very rarely, the names) of witnesses. 1 The identities of undercover agents may also remain confidential during trial, and agents
may testify under an alias, or their police handlers may be allowed
to testify in their place. 72 Such protection of undercover agents and
related files must be justified on the grounds of "national or state
interest" and requires preapproval at the ministerial level.73
C. Contents and Completeness of the File
The "investigative file" that the court and the defense review
contains documents relating to the case that the prosecution or any
id. § 201(1).
68. See BOYNE, supra note 48, at 142 (noting that in white-collar crimes cases, which tend
to be more complicated and lengthier, it often takes "between 6 months to 2 years to review
an investigation file and decide whether or not to open a main proceeding').
69. See StPO § 199 (noting that the file is submitted to the trial court together with the
charging instrument).
70. See Interview with Daniel W61ky, Defense Attorney, in Cologne, Ger. (June 18, 2014)
[hereinafter Interview with Wolky]; Interview with Sommer & Tharra, supra note 58.
71. The names and addresses of witnesses normally must be included in the indictment,
which is part of the file. StPO § 200(1). If there are concerns about the witness's safety, then
the address may be omitted from the indictment and the file. Id. §§ 68(2), 200(1). If the
prosecution can point to concrete evidence that the witness's safety may be endangered, the
name of the witness may also be kept confidential even after the investigation is complete,
and the witness may be permitted to testify under an alias at trial. Id. §§ 68(3), 200(1).
72. See id. § 110b(3) ("[M]aintaining the secrecy of the identity in criminal proceedings
shall be admissible pursuant to Section 96, particularly if there is reason to fear that
revealing the identity would endanger the life, limb or liberty of the undercover investigator
or of another person, or would jeopardize the continued use of the undercover investigator.");
SOMMER, supra note 49, at 149; Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in
Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 493, 506 (2007).
73. StPO § 96; SOMMER, supra note 49, at 149.
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state investigative agency have gathered.14 It may contain exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence.7 5 Under the law, German police
and prosecutors have a duty to gather both types of evidence as part
of their duty to investigate the case objectively.7 6 In practice, as a
result of cognitive biases and structural roles that tend to produce
a more partisan approach to the investigation, the police and the
prosecution may not always appreciate the exculpatory nature of
certain evidence and therefore may not collect the evidence.7 7 But at
the very least, they appear to follow up on defense requests to interrogate specific witnesses or check an alibi or affirmative defense.7
The file may therefore contain documents that have been gathered
by state authorities at the request of the defense.
Importantly, under the principle of "completeness of the file"
(Aktenvollstdndigkeit),police are required to record and include in
the file all information that is potentially relevant to the case.79 As
74. These include expert reports, statements by the defendant, witness statements, police
reports, and instructions from the prosecution about investigative steps to be taken in the
case. It also covers files in related noncriminal proceedings, as long as these may be relevant
to the defendant's case. See, e.g., Schlothauer, MAH Strafverteidigung, § 3 Ermittlungsverfahren, Rn. 48 (2d ed. 2014); see also BOHLANDER, supranote 44, at 104 n.20. The file does not
include physical evidence, which can be reviewed by the defense attorney as early as the
investigative stage at the office of the prosecutor, but cannot be copied or taken out of the
prosecutor's office. StPO § 147(1), (4). For an understanding of the difficulties of inspecting
certain "physical" evidence, such as DVD recordings of telephone surveillance, see Daniel
W6lky, Beschrankung der Verteidigung dutrch Einschrdnkung des Akteneinsichtsrechts,
STRAFVERTEIDIGER FORUM [StraFo] 493 (2013).
75. StPO § 160(2).
76. Id.
77. See SOMMER, supra note 49, at 32-36; see also Wolky, supra note 74 (noting the
difference between the ideal of the objective prosecutor and the reality of prosecutors who may
be careless, overzealous, or cognitively biased and may therefore not be best positioned to
determine the relevance of evidence to the case).
78. The law requires the prosecution to follow up on the defense's request if the evidence
sought is relevant to the case. StPO § 163a(2). This leaves some unreviewable discretion to
the prosecutor in determining relevance, but defense attorney manuals do not point to a
problem with prosecutorial practice in this respect. See, e.g., SOMMER, supra note 49, at 88-89;
Bockemiihl, supranote 36, at 75.
79. The Code of Criminal Procedure formally requires the prosecution to record the
"results" of investigative measures in the file. See StPO § 168b(l); MEYER-GoSSNER, supra
note 31, § 168b(1), at 712. But the majority view tends to support application of the provision
to the police. LOWE-ROSENBERG, DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR, § 168b(1) Rn. 2a & n.7 (26th ed. 2008); Wohlers & Schlegel,
supra note 36, at 487. The prosecution is responsible for terminating the investigation and
must note this final step in the file. StPO § 169a.
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courts have affirmed, this principle means that there cannot be
gaps in the file.8" The file thus includes records of every relevant
investigative measure taken by the police, the prosecutor, or an
investigating judge, as well as any of the prosecutor's written instructions for such investigative measures.8 " The police also have a
duty to transmit the file to the prosecution "without delay." 2 The
comprehensive record of investigative steps allows the defense and
the court to understand the chronology of investigative decisions
made in the case and, in some cases, to determine whether relevant
evidence may have been overlooked. Defense attorneys note that
police do occasionally omit relevant investigative steps from the file,
particularly with respect to the use of undercover agents." While no
empirical study of the frequency of such omissions from the file
appears to exist, commentators have not identified the omission of
investigative steps as a systematic problem.
Some practitioners have also voiced concerns about the occasional
omission of so-called Spurenakten from the file." The term Spurenakten (literally, "trace documents") refers to leads that the police or
80. See Wohlers & Schlegel, supra note 36, at 487 (citing Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen [BGHST] [Federal Court of Justice for Criminal Matters] Oct. 10, 1990, 37 (204)); see
also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 12, 2013, NJW 277 (281), 2014.
81. See BOYNE, supranote 48, at 53 ("[P]rosecutors record virtually every decision related
to a criminal case's investigation and prosecution in case files."). These instructions are the
standard method of communication between prosecutors and investigative agencies and other
prosecutors who might work on the case at a later point.
82. StPO § 163(2); see also id. § 163(1) (CTheauthorities and officials in the police force
shall investigate criminal offenses and shall take all measures that may not be deferred, in
order to prevent concealment of facts.").
83. See BOYNE, supranote 48, at 50-53. As subsequent discussion reveals, however, if the
police fail to follow up on certain leads, or if they do not consider investigated leads relevant
to the case, these leads would not be mentioned in the file. See Interview with Prosecutors,
supranote 21. A lack of record in such cases would make it difficult for the defense and the
judges to appreciate that certain evidence may have been overlooked.
84. See, e.g., Interview with Sommer & Tharra, supra note 58 (an experienced defense
attorney noting that, in his practice, he has often seen omissions of relevant investigative
measures from the file, particularly when it comes to the use of undercover agents). But cf.
Interview with Prosecutors, supra note 21 ("We [prosecutors] document everything in the file.
We follow the principle of truth and completeness of the file. We don't know what the police
do [whether they enter all investigative measures in the file]. We assume that the file is complete. Sometimes the police call us and say that witnesses have said something in addition.
Then we write this down in the file. From our perspective the file should be complete.").
85. See, e.g., SOMMER, supranote 49, at 148; Interview with Sommer & Tharra, supranote
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prosecutors have investigated but dismissed as immaterial.8 6 Such
failed leads must only be made part of the file and disclosed to the
defense if they are relevant to the defendant's case.87 But since
relevance is assessed by the police, potentially exculpatory evidence
may be omitted from the file because the investigating authorities
may not be able to appreciate the value it may have to the defense.8 8
If the defense believes that relevant Spurenakten have been omitted
from the file, it can petition the court for access to the documents.8 9
There is no empirical evidence of the frequency with which relevant
and perhaps even exculpatory evidence might be lost in Spurenakten.90
Another potential concern with the completeness of the file is the
rarity of audio or video recording of interrogations and witness interviews.9 1 Police officers typically provide only a detailed summary
of the interview or interrogation. 92 The defendant or witness may
86. SeeLutzMeyer-Gossner, Die BehandlungkriminalpolizeilicherSpurenakten im Strafverfahren, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 353, 353 (1982); Michalke, supra note

36, at 2335.
87. See BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 1, 1983, NJW273 (276), 1983; see also
BOHLANDER, supra note 44, at 62.
88. See, e.g., SOMMER, supranote 49, at 148; Karl Peters, Anmerkung, BVerfG, Beschluss
vom 12.01.1983-2 BvR 864/81, NStZ 273 (276), 1983; Interview with Sommer & Tharra,
supra note 58.
89. The petition is filed under Section 23 of the Introductory Law to the Judicature Act
(EGGVG). MEYER-GosSNER, supranote 31, at 614, § 147 Rn. 40 (citing BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 1, 1983, NJW 83 (1043), 1983); PFEIFFER, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG
§ 147 Rn. 3 (5th ed. 2005).
90. Some commentators have pointed out that, with scientific and technological advances
that allow the police to conduct "dragnet" investigations more easily, Spurenakten will in.
crease in number. See, e.g., Meyer-Gossner, supra note 86, at 353. Commentators, however,
have not complained about systematic exclusion of relevant Spurenaktenfrom investigative
files. But cf. SOMMER, supra note 49, at 148 (suggesting that in order to guarantee that all relevant documents are included in the file, the investigating authorities should at least list the
Spurenakten they have gathered); Interview with Sommer & Tharra, supra note 58 (suggesting that it is problematic that the police and prosecution decide without input from the
defense which acts are relevant to the case).
91. See Weigend & Salditt, supra note 46, at 84 (noting that interrogations are not
routinely recorded); see also StPO § 58a(1) (providing for optional video recording of witness
interviews).
92. See MEYER-GoSSNER, supra note 31, § 163a Rn. 10, 31 (noting that the protocol of the
interrogation of the defendant must be detailed); Richtlinien flr das Strafverfahren und das
Bul3geldverfahren [RiStBV] [Guidelines for Criminal Procedures and Fines] § 45(2),
http://www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-internet.de/bsvwvbund_0 1011977_42082 1R
5902002.htm [https://perma.cc/AP6J-78RC] (recommending, inter alia, that for important
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review summaries of the questions and answers, but this does not
eliminate the risk that the summary includes occasional misinterpretations of the original statements. 3
While the lack of recording or verbatim transcript and the occasional omission of Spurenakten may reduce the accuracy of German
investigative files, on the whole, they remain quite detailed, particularly in comparison to police reports in the United States. 4 German
files typically include records of every relevant investigative measure, including measures requested by the defense.9 5 Moreover,
because the investigation generally must be finished by the time the
prosecutor files formal charges with the court, the file is comprehensive and "trial-ready" even before plea negotiations begin.9 6
D. Defendant and Defense Attorney: Different Rights of Access to
the File
The right to inspect the evidence-whether at the investigative
or the trial stage-belongs to the defense attorney and not to the defendant.9 Accordingly, self-represented defendants are merely given
excerpts or summaries of the evidence in the file, as necessary, to

parts of the interrogation, the transcript should, to the extent possible, contain a verbatim
record of the questions and answers). Although these guidelines are directed at prosecutors,
they also apply to police officers as agents of the prosecution. See, e.g., Meyberg, Beck'scher
Online-Kommentar StPO, RiStBV 45, Form der Vernehmung und Niederschrift, Rn. 1 (2015).
For examples of detailed summaries of police interrogations and witness interviews, see
FEENEY & HERRMANN, supra note 25, at 208-11, 218-21, 226-28.
93. FEENEY & HERRMANN, supra note 25, at 357.
94. See id. at 356-57; see also BOYNE, supra note 48, at 51-52; MAximo Langer & Kent
Roach, Rights in the CriminalProcess:A Case Study of Convergence and DisclosureRights,
in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONALLAW 273,277 (Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner
& Cheryl Saunders eds., 2013) (describing how the weight of the dossier in inquisitorial criminal proceedings incentivizes more thorough record keeping).
95. BOYNE, supra note 48, at 53.
96. This statement applies with respect to felony cases, which are the focus of this Article.
In less serious cases, plea negotiations may be conducted before the conclusion of the investigation, and a disposition through penal order under section 407 or a conditional dismissal
under section 153a of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be agreed upon. See StPO §§ 153a,
407.
97. StPO § 147(1) ("Defence counsel shall have authority to inspect those files which are
available to the court or which will have to be submitted to the court if charges are preferred,
as well as to inspect officially impounded pieces of evidence.") (emphasis added); see also
Wessing, supra note 48, § 147 Rn. 1.
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ensure adequate self-representation.9 8 This restriction is of limited
practical significance, however, because, at least in serious cases,
the principle of mandatory defense applies, which means that the
court will appoint an attorney for the defendant even if the defendant objects.9 9 Consequently, the question of access to the file for pro
se defendants arises only in minor cases.
In cases where the defendant is represented, the law also imposes
some limits on the attorney's ability to share information from the
file with the client. In general, defense attorneys are able, and even
professionally obligated, to tell their clients about relevant information gleaned from the file.'0 0 They can inform clients of the information orally, or, as is more commonly the practice, simply forward
copies of the file to clients.' 1 But if there is concrete evidence that
the defendant would misuse certain information in the file to endanger the investigation (especially to threaten a witness), or if
possession of some of the documents themselves is a crime (as in
cases of child pornography), then, according to the prevailing view,
the attorney may not provide copies of the materials to the client. 102
98. StPO § 147(7). European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence has clarified that selfrepresented defendants have an independent right to inspect at least some of the evidence in
the case, and this prompted the German legislature to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure
in 2000 to provide pro se defendants some access to the evidence.
99. For a listing of the various situations in which the principle of mandatory defense
applies, see StPO § 140 (providing that a defense attorney must be appointed in certain
complex or serious cases, such as felony cases, cases in which the mental capacity of the
accused might be in question, and other cases of factual or legal complexity). The need to
inspect the file can itself be grounds for appointing an attorney, if, for example, the file
contains inconsistent witness statements or expert reports critical to the resolution of the
case, or more generally, if a comprehensive evaluation of the file is necessary for adequate
representation. See MEYER-GOSSNER, supra note 31, § 140 Rn. 27, at 559.
100. BOHLANDER, supra note 44, at 63.
101. See SOMMER, supra note 49, at 149-50; Bockemiuhl, supra note 36, at 74; Weigend &
Salditt, supra note 46, at 93.
102. See Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt a.M. [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt]
Apr. 11, 2013, NJW 1107,2013 (holding that defense attorney can be convicted of distribution
of child pornography after passing along to his client images of child pornography contained
in the investigative file); Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] [Federal Court of
Justice for Criminal Matters] Mar. 10, 1979, 29 (99, Rn. 9-11), 1979 (noting that a defense
attorney may not pass along information from the file to the client if this would endanger the
investigation, for example, by thwarting a pending investigative measure).
The question of whether and under what circumstances a defense attorney may be
prohibited from passing along information from the file to the client remains controversial.
Most commentators seem to agree that such a prohibition would be valid during the investigative stage if the attorney knows that transmission to the client would result in a concrete
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E. Lack of Reciprocal Disclosure by Defense Attorneys
In Germany, unlike in most U.S. jurisdictions, the defense has no
reciprocal obligation to disclose evidence gathered before trial.'
The defense does have to disclose (typically after the indictment is
filed and before trial begins) names and addresses of witnesses that
it intends to present at the trial.'0 4 But defense attorneys rarely use
this method to bring witnesses to court because it obliges them to
pay for the witnesses' travel and lost-wages expenses." 5 Instead,
defense attorneys typically ask the court to call the witnesses, and

danger to the investigation. See, e.g., PFEIFFER, supra note 89, § 147 Rn. 8, 10 (noting that a
defense attorney may be prohibited from disclosing to his or her client information that would
endanger the investigations); SOMMER, supra note 49, at 55; Annekatrin Donath & Bastian
Mehle, Akteneinsichtsrecht und Unterrichtungdes Mandanten durch den Verteidiger, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 1399, 1399-1400 (2009) (noting that disclosure cannot
be restricted on vague suspicions that the defendant might interfere with the investigation;
the danger must be concrete); Michalke, supranote 36, at 2336; Wessing, supra note 48, § 147
Rn. 23 (noting that a defense attorney may be prohibited from transmitting to his or her client
information from the file when that information could be used for no legitimate purpose and
would endanger the investigation; the mere possibility that the defendant might misuse the
materials is insufficient to prohibit transmission); see also Interview with Prosecutors, supra
note 21 (noting that prosecutors occasionally appeal to defense attorneys not to disclose
certain portions of the file to their clients and remind them that they are also "organs of
justice," but adding that the prosecution cannot prohibit a defense attorney from disclosing
the file to his or her client).
Contrary to the majority view, some defense attorneys and commentators have argued that
such restrictions, particularly if interpreted broadly, could infringe on the attorneys' duties
to their clients. E.g., SOMMER, supranote 49, at 55; Wilhelm Krekeler, Strafrechtliche Grenzen
der Verteidigung,NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 146, 149-50 (1989) (noting that
a defense attorney may not be prohibited from telling the client about a pending search or
arrest, but that the attorney may be prohibited from sharing information that he or she knows
would be used for criminal purposes, such as threatening a witness); Volkmar Mehle, Weiter.
gabe von Informationenals Strafvereitelung,NEUE ZEITSCHRIIP FuR STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 556,
558 (1983) (critiquing the "prevailing view" that attorneys could be prohibited from passing
along information from the file to clients when such transmission would endanger the investigation); Wessing, supra note 48, § 147 Rn. 5a (noting that the prosecution cannot impose a
condition on the defense attorney not to inform clients of future investigative measures, even
when such information would endanger the investigation); see also Oberlandesgericht
Hamburg [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Hamburg] Sept. 9, 1991, NStZ 50, 1992 (holding
that a defense attorney may not be banned from passing materials to a client that might
endanger the investigation once the investigative stage is over, but noting controversy as to
whether such a prohibition may be possible during the investigative stage).
103. Weigend & Salditt, supra note 46, at 94; see also BOHLANDER, supra note 44, at 114.
104. StPO § 222(2); see also BOHLANDER, supra note 44, at 114.
105. StPO § 220(2).
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the court then informs both parties about the selected witnesses. °6
This can occur either just before trial or during trial itself, depending on the timing of the defense motion." 7
Given the commitment of German criminal procedure to the
search for truth, it may seem surprising that reciprocal discovery is
not required of the defense. But the lack of reciprocal discovery
likely reflects the inquisitorial view that the proceedings should be
conducted as one objective inquiry into the evidence, rather than
two competing investigations.0 8 Moreover, because German defense
attorneys remain relatively passive and rely heavily on the court
and the prosecution for the collection of evidence, the lack of reciprocal disclosure obligations is less practically significant.
In short, German defense attorneys receive broad pretrial disclosure from the prosecution, but they are under no duty to reveal
evidence they have gathered in return. The court also receives the
entire investigative file as soon as charges are filed. °9 Because the
investigative file is very detailed and the investigation is generally
complete before the trial begins, the file is regarded as a reliable
and sufficient source of information for the parties and the court before trial.' As the next Part lays out, in plea bargained cases the
investigative file also informs both the defense and the court about
the evidence before negotiations begin.

106. Id. §§ 219(1), 222 (1).
107. Id. §§ 219(1), 244(2), 246; see also BOHLANDER, supranote 44, at 114. Defense motions
to take evidence (including to call specific witnesses) can be denied only if:
the fact to be proved is irrelevant to the decision or has already been proved, the
evidence is wholly inappropriate or unobtainable, the application is made to
protract the proceedings, or an important allegation which is intended to offer
proof in exoneration of the defendant may be treated as if the alleged fact were
true.
StPO § 244(3).
108. See Langer & Roach, supra note 94, at 278.
109. StPO § 199.
110. While the court may take additional evidence before deciding whether to confirm the
charges, this rarely happens in practice. See id. § 202; GERcKE ET AL., supra note 36, § 202 Rn.
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCLOSURE AND PLEA
BARGAINING IN GERMAN CRIMINAL CASES

In a number of adversarial jurisdictions that have recently adopted broad pre-plea disclosure, such disclosure has been defended as
a means of expediting cases.1 11 Advocates have argued that issues
are clarified more quickly and that defendants are more likely to
plead guilty once they see the evidence against them.1 2 But other
commentators and policymakers have claimed that a requirement
of pre-plea disclosure would in fact undermine the efficiency of plea
bargaining."' While the efficiency of pre-plea disclosure remains
disputed, few would disagree with the argument that early disclosure produces more informed guilty pleas and a fairer process. To
understand how disclosure and plea bargaining interact in Germany, it is worth examining briefly how German law has regulated
the relatively recent practice of "negotiated judgments.""' 4
For a long time, the German criminal justice system resolved
cases without resorting to plea bargaining. But as caseloads began
to swell in the 1970s, the German legislature introduced a number
of simplified trial and diversion procedures to allow the system to
process cases more efficiently." 5 For various reasons, these measures were insufficient to address the problem, and by the 1980s,
German judges and practitioners began negotiating cases informally, without any legislative authorization." 6 In 1987, the German
Constitutional Court first acknowledged the practice and attempted

111. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
112. Turner & Redlich, supra note 7 (manuscript at 12, 43).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,631-32 (2002); Baer, supra note 4, at 51.
114. In describing the German practice of exchanging an admission of guilt for a reduced
sentence, the term "negotiated judgment" is technically more accurate than the term "plea
bargaining." German defendants do not merely enter a guilty plea, but rather tender a
confession, which does not obviate the subsequent trial. German courts therefore call the
practice an "understanding," "deal," or "negotiated judgment." Because "plea bargaining" is
the term commonly used in the U.S. literature, however, I use this term throughout the rest
of the Article for the sake of convenience and clarity.
115. This overview of the plea bargaining process in Germany is based in large part on
Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Constitutionalityof Negotiated Criminal
Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 82, 83-85 (2014).
116. For a discussion of the possible causes of the spread of plea bargaining, see id. at 86.
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to establish some basic guidelines for its operation." 7 The Federal
Supreme Court subsequently elaborated on the rules for negotiating
judgments, drawing on both constitutional and statutory principles."l But as the practice grew, the court eventually acknowledged
the limits to its ability to regulate the practice in the absence of
express statutory authorization. In 2005, the court called on the
German legislature to develop clear rules with respect to plea
bargaining," 9 and the legislature did so in 2009 with an amendment
to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 20 The statute largely codified
the existing case law, with a few minor modifications.' 2 ' The German Constitutional Court upheld the statute and reaffirmed the
22
limits on plea bargaining in a 2013 decision.
From a comparative perspective, several key features of German
law and practice of plea bargaining stand out. The first is the timing
of plea bargaining and the effect that it has on the participants' information base. At least in more serious cases, bargaining occurs
after the investigation has been closed and formal charges have
been filed with the court. 23 This means that the police and prosecution have compiled all the evidence they need to present the case at
trial. Because the file is available to the court and the defense as
soon as the investigation is completed, this helps to ensure that all
of the relevant actors have a good understanding of the case before
they negotiate a resolution. Plea bargaining in Germany is therefore used not so much to truncate the prosecution's inquiry into the
117. See BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 27, 1987, NJW 2662, 1987.
118. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 28, 1997, translatedin
STEPHEN THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 145-46 (2002).

119. See BGH [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 3, 2005, translatedin JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA
BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 96 (2009).

120. See Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Regelung der VerstAndigung im Strafverfahren,
DEUTSCHERBUNDESTAG: DRUJCKSACHEN [BT] 16/1230, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd16/

123/612310.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMJ9-HG8R].
121. See, e.g., StPO §§ 257b, 257c.
122. See BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2628/10, 2 BvR 2883/10, 2 BvR
2155/11, Mar. 19, 2013, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidun
genIDE/2013/03/rs20130319_2bvr262810.html [https://perma.ccJHQ8E-HVP7] [hereinafter
2013 Constitutional Court Decision].
123. See StPO § 257b. In certain relatively minor cases, where the prosecution has the
discretion to refrain from pressing charges on certain conditions, negotiations occur between
the prosecution and the defense and typically do not involve the court. These negotiations
occur before the filing of charges. See id. § 153(1).
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in the United States, but rather to shorten
facts, as often happens
124
proceedings.
trial
the
The second notable feature of German plea bargaining is the
active role that judges play in the process. German judges discuss
the case with the parties and indicate what sentence might be appropriate in light of the facts presented in the file and during the
discussions.2 5 They also verify that the admission of guilt corresponds to the facts in the investigative file, and if they have any
doubts about the case after the discussions, they have both the duty
and the ability to investigate the facts independently-for example,
by calling witnesses during the main proceeding, which occurs even
in negotiated cases.'2 6
The position of German prosecutors is also distinctive. They are
legally prohibited from negotiating charge bargains, at least in more
serious cases, because they are bound by the principle of mandatory
prosecution in such cases and because the plea bargaining provision
of the Criminal Procedure Code expressly bans agreements concerning the guilt of the accused.1 27 Moreover, the final decision on
the charges rests with the judges, who can (and often do) convict on
charges different from those listed in the indictment.12 A limited
form of charge bargaining occurs on occasion, but it is the court that

124. Again, this statement applies only to the more serious cases. In less serious cases, the
investigation can be cut short if the parties agree to a conditional dismissal under section
153a or a penal order under section 407. See id. §§ 153a, 407.
125. See id. §§ 257b, 257c; Jenia Iontcheva Turner, JudicialParticipationin PleaNegotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 219-20 (2006).
126. In practice, judges often rely solely on the confession and the investigative file as a
factual basis for the conviction. KARSTEN ALTENHAIN ET AL., DIE PRAXIS DER ABSPRACHEN IN
STRAFVERFAHREN 93, 99-100 (2013). Since the results of the study were released, the German
Constitutional Court has emphasized that judges must do more to corroborate a negotiated
confession. See 2013 Constitutional Court Decision, supra note 122, 71; see also Andreas
Mosbacher, The Decision of the FederalConstitutionalCourtof 19 March 2013 on PleaAgreements, 15 GERMAN L.J. 5, 8 (2014); Alexander Schemmel et al., PleaBargainingin Criminal
Proceedings: Changes to Criminal Defense Counsel Practiceas a Result of the German Constitutional Court Verdict of 19 March 2013?, 15 GERMAN L.J. 43, 59-60 (2014).
127. See StPO §§ 170(2), 257c(2). By contrast, limits on charge bargaining are the exception rather than the rule in the United States. See, e.g., TURNER, supra note 119, at 28.
128. The court may convict the defendant of different (including more serious) crimes than
those charged, as long as the court bases the new charges on facts in the indictment and gives
the defendant proper notice. See StPO § 265.
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determines the charges to be requalified or dismissed, not the prosecution. "'
Prosecutors also have comparatively minor influence over the
negotiated sentence. 3 ° Judges make sentencing decisions, for both
negotiated and contested cases, and they have relatively broad
discretion in the matter.'3 ' Judges are prohibited from promising a
specific sentence during plea negotiations, but surveys reveal that
in practice, judges often indicate indirectly what sentence a defendant might expect if he admits guilt.'32 And although both the
prosecutor's and the defendant's consent is required for a sentence
offer to become binding,'33 the judge's ultimate authority to impose
punishment in the case means that he or she has significant influence over the sentence negotiated.
Judges' sentencing discretion is not entirely unrestrained, however. Even a bargained sentence must remain proportionate to the
defendant's blameworthiness.'3 4 In practice, the reduction for admitting guilt tends to be no higher than one-third of the expected
trial sentence.'3 5 Unlike their U.S. counterparts, German courts
have proven willing to strike down sentences that reflect more substantial discounts on the grounds that such discounts are both
disproportionate and potentially coercive." 6
129. See id. § 154. When the case contains a number of repetitive offenses, the court may
dismiss counts "so as not to waste time in reviewing each individual count of the accusation,"
and such charge reduction typically does not result in a significant sentence discount. Turner,
supra note 125, at 219. A more recent empirical study also found that, despite legal prohibitions, more problematic charge bargaining occasionally does occur in German courtrooms.
See ALTENHAIN ET AL., supra note 126, at 77-78, 86-87. For example, roughly 14 percent of
judges surveyed admitted that, as a result of negotiations, they had at some point agreed to
requalify criminal conduct as negligent rather than intentional. Id. at 86.
130. Turner, supranote 125, at 215, 218.
131. See id. at 215, 218, 223.
132. See ALTENHAIN ET AL., supra note 126, at 118, 123; see also Turner, supra note 125,
at 222.
133. See StPO § 257c(3).
74, 105, 111, 113.
134. See 2013 Constitutional Court Decision, supra note 122,
135. See ALTENHAIN ET AL., supra note 126, at 130-31; Turner, supra note 125, at 235.
136. See, e.g., 2013 Constitutional Court Decision, supranote 122, 130 (striking down a
negotiated sentence as disproportionately lenient); Turner, supra note 125, at 217 & n.86
(citing cases). In most cases, proportionality is enforced when plea negotiations fail, the
defendant is sentenced after contested proceedings, and he or she appeals the posttrial
sentence as disproportionate. The parties typically do not have the incentive to appeal a
negotiated sentence as disproportionate. See Turner, supra note 125, at 216.
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German courts also differ from American courts in their approach
to negotiated waivers. As a general matter, German law prohibits
the parties from bargaining for any waivers that are not inherent in
an admission of guilt.137 For example, negotiated appeals waivers
are expressly prohibited on the grounds that they undermine the
judicial accountability required in a system based on a rule of law. 138
Defendants are also unable to bargain away their right to counsel
and their right to effective counsel.139 Indeed, defendants may not
even waive the right to trial as they can in the United States; the
main proceeding occurs even after an admission of guilt, but it is
shorter than a contested trial. 4 ' Bargained-for discovery waivers
cannot occur in practice because the defendant receives access to the
file before negotiations occur.' Even if they could, they would violate the Criminal Procedure Code and would almost certainly be
held unconstitutional.1 4 2
Finally, the German Constitutional Court has emphasized that
plea negotiations must be conducted in a transparent fashion. The
contents of the agreement between the parties and the court must
137. See Christopher Slobogin, PleaBargainingand the Substantive and ProceduralGoals
of Criminal Justice: From Retribution and Adversarialism to Preventive Justice and HybridInquisitorialism,57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505 (2016). A waiver of the right to remain silent
is inherent in the admission of guilt and accepted in German law. TURNER, supra note 119,
at 108-09. Other waivers commonly inherent in plea bargaining, such as the waiver of the
right to a contested trial before an impartial court or the waiver of the right to confront
witnesses, do not formally accompany an admission of guilt in Germany. Id. at 109. Although
the admission shortens trial proceedings, it does not eliminate them. Id. The defendant
likewise retains the right to confront witnesses at the abbreviated trial. Id. As a practical
matter, an admission of guilt essentially results in a noncontested proceeding at which the
defense confronts witnesses only in an exceptional case. Id.
138. See StPO § 302(1); BGH [Federal Court of Justice], GSSt 1/04, 50 Entscheidungen des
BGHSt [Federal Court of Justice] 40 (Mar. 3, 2005), translatedin TURNER, supra note 119,
at 96. A survey found that despite the prohibition, the parties frequently agree to waive appeals after a sentence agreement is reached. ALTENHAIN ET AL., supra note 126, at 183.
139. See StPO § 140; Weigend & Turner, supra note 115, at 103.
140. Andreas Ransiek, Zur Urteilsabspracheim Strafprozess: ein amerikanischer Fall,
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK [ZIS] 116 (2008).
141. See, e.g., Interview with Sommer & Tharra, supranote 58. Although discovery waivers
cannot be negotiated, in one case, a court attempted to limit the defense's right to review the
file during the main proceeding, after supplementary evidence was added, in order to expedite
the proceedings. This decision by the trial court was firmly rejected on appeal. See BGH
[Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 30, 2003, NStZ 666, 2003.
142. See StPO § 257c(2). On their likely unconstitutionality, see 2013 Constitutional Court
73-74, 109.
Decision, supra note 122,
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be placed on the record once the main proceedings begin.143 The
court must also place certain warnings to the defendant on the
record-for example, a warning that judges may deviate from the
bargain if new legal or factual circumstances emerge before sentencing, and that an appeals waiver cannot form part of the
agreement.14 4 Although a 2012 empirical study found that courts
frequently failed to follow these requirements, compliance may improve, as the Constitutional Court's 2013 decision has made it easier
for defendants to challenge verdicts based on procedural violations
145
of the plea bargaining statute.
In sum, in several important respects, plea negotiations in Germany are regulated more closely than negotiations in the United
States. Limits on sentencing discounts and charge bargains reduce
the possibility that negotiations would result in a disproportionate
sentence or coerce innocent defendants to admit guilt. Open-file
disclosure to the defense and to the court before negotiations is an
important element of Germany's regulatory framework. Broad and
early disclosure permits the court and the defense to ensure that the
admission of guilt rests on a valid factual basis, that punishment
fits the blameworthiness of the defendant, and that the investigation has been conducted fairly.
Although these various legal constraints may reduce the efficiency of plea bargaining, the tradeoff is generally accepted. Occasional
deviations from the regulations occur with respect to judicial scrutiny into the factual basis of the guilty plea, the documentation of the
bargain, and appeals waivers, but foundational rules such as proportionate sentencing, the right to counsel for negotiated judgments,
pre-plea discovery, and the prohibition on charge bargains are generally respected.14 These limits on plea bargaining are respected
despite caseload pressures that are in many ways similar to those
in the U.S. criminal justice system.'4 7
143. See StPO § 243(4); 2013 Constitutional Court Decision, supra note 122,
67, 80-86.
144. See StPO § 257c(5); 2013 Constitutional Court Decision, supranote 122,
95-96, 12627.
145. See 2013 Constitutional Court Decision, supranote 122,
96-99; see also Mosbacher,
supra note 126, at 12-13; Schemmel et al., supra note 126, at 60.
146. See ALTENHAIN ET AL., supra note 126, at 181-83.
147. See Volker Krey & Oliver Windgatter, The Untenable Situation of German Criminal
Law: Against QuantitativeOverloading,Qualitative Overcharging,and the Overexpansion of
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III. COMPARING

GERMAN DISCLOSURE RULES TO OPEN-FILE
DISCLOSURE IN THE UNITED STATES

For a long time, German law provided the defense with significantly greater rights to review evidence in criminal cases in
comparison to the law in adversarial jurisdictions such as the
United States. 4 ' Traditionally, this neglect of disclosure rights in
adversarial systems was explained with reference to the lesser emphasis on the search for truth in criminal cases in these systems. 1 49
In this view, the primary aim of adversarial procedure is the settlement of the conflict between the parties, and1a broader inquiry into
the facts of the case is deemed unnecessary. 50
Another explanation for the more limited disclosure in adversarial systems is the competitive element inherent in the traditional
procedures of those systems. The defense and the prosecution are
responsible for developing their own cases. 1 ' Accordingly, the defense is expected to investigate the facts independently rather than
relying on the state for information. 152 By contrast, inquisitorial
systems view evidence gathering not as a competitive enterprise,
but rather as a neutral inquiry into the truth; disclosure to the
defense is understood as part of the effort to advance that unified
inquiry.'

Criminal Justice, 13 GERMAN L.J. 579, 586-92 (2012); see also BOYNE, supra note 48, at 8-9,
72-80.
148. See Weigend & Salditt, supra note 46, at 79.
149. See Peter Duff, Disclosure in Scottish Criminal Procedure: Another Step in an
InquisitorialDirection?, 11 INYL J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 153, 174 (2007).
150. See HEINZE, supra note 27, at 310 ("A process devoted to the absorption of disputes
does not tolerate compelled disclosure of material beyond the ambit of the issues defined by
the parties; such information can open up new controversies rather than advancing the resolution.").
151. Duff, supra note 149, at 173.
152. See id.; Langer & Roach, supra note 94, at 276-77.
153. See, e.g., FEENEY & HERRMANN, supranote 25, at 424 ("Because it focuses on the case
rather than the parties, the inquisitorial German system has had no hesitation in directing
the prosecution and the court to disclose the whole case file."). The move toward broad disclosure of evidence in criminal cases, which occurred in the late nineteenth century, was
relatively modern in the history of the German inquisitorial system. It reflected not merely
a belief that disclosure would help advance the inquiry into the facts, but also a recognition
of the defendant as a subject in the process. See supranote 37 and accompanying text.
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Approaches to disclosure have begun to converge over the last
couple of decades as adversarial systems like those in Australia,
Canada, England, New Zealand, Scotland, and several U.S. states
54
have implemented reforms to expand defense discovery rights.
These reforms recognize that broad discovery in criminal cases is
consistent with key goals of both adversarial and inquisitorial
systems: fairness and efficiency, as well as the search for truth.
In the United States, states such as North Carolina and Texas
have recently adopted open-file discovery, which generally entitles
the defense to review the entire prosecution file.'55 A number of
other states, including Arizona, Colorado, New Jersey, and New
Mexico, have very expansive pre-plea discovery, almost equivalent
to open-file. 5 In all of these states, the defense obtains access to the
prosecution's evidence early in the process, typically before any plea
negotiations take place.' 5 7 Expansive pre-plea disclosure is supported on the grounds that it ensures fair proceedings and promotes
the search for truth. 5 ' In some states, pre-plea disclosure is further
justified as a means of expediting proceedings-an argument not
usually made in defense of the German discovery regime but recog159
nized more commonly by commentators in adversarial systems.
154. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1; Cow. R. CRIM. P. 16; N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3; N.M. R. CRIM.
P. 5-501; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2011); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 39.14 (West 2015); Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 § 37 (Eng.); Criminal Disclosure Act
2008 s 13 (N.Z.); R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (Can.); Baer, supranote 4, at 22; Duff,
supra note 149, at 174.
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903; TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoC. ANN. art. 39.14. In North Carolina,
open-file discovery applies only to cases within the original jurisdiction of the Superior
Court-essentially, open-fie discovery is limited to felonies. Open-file legislation typically
excludes from disclosure the following categories of documents: the prosecution's work product; certain personal data about witnesses (for example, social security number); witness
identity and/or address if the court authorizes the nondisclosure on the grounds that the witness's safety may be at risk; and the identity of confidential informants. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-904; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (a), (c), (f).
156. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRiM. P. 15.1; COLO.R. CRIM. P. 16; N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3; N.M. R. CRIM.
P. 5-501; OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16. See generally Baer, supra note 4, at 22.
157. In Texas, before a defendant pleads guilty, the parties must "acknowledge in writing
or on the record in open court the disclosure, receipt, and list of all documents, items, and information provided to the defendant under [the law]." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
39.140). In North Carolina, requests for discovery are to be filed within ten days of a probable
cause finding (or the date the defendant waives probable cause). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A902(d).,
158. See, e.g., Turner & Redlich, supra note 7 (manuscript at 12-13, 43).
159. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM.PROC. 15.1 committee cmt. to 2003 amend. ("Codification of the
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As in Germany, limits on disclosure at the pretrial stage in U.S.
open-file jurisdictions can be imposed if there are particularized
concerns about the safety of witnesses or the integrity of the investigation. 6 ° Such restrictions must be approved by the court on a
case-by-case basis. 1 ' In at least some U.S. open-file jurisdictions,
self-represented defendants also receive more limited disclosure
because of concerns that such defendants might tamper with the
evidence or otherwise interfere with the investigation.'6 2 Finally,
restrictions may be placed on the ability of defense attorneys to
communicate certain witness information (such as home address
and other personal data) to their clients. 6 3
Although the broad outline of discovery in U.S. open-file jurisdictions and Germany is the same, notable distinctions remain. The
first important difference relates to the role of the court in the discovery process. In Germany, once formal charges are filed, the court
receives the complete investigative file.' As discussed earlier, the
file contains all documents and records relevant to the case.'6 5 Disclosure to the court allows judges to fulfill the central role they are
accorded in German criminal procedure, both during negotiations
common practice of initial disclosure prior to or at the arraignment phase of the proceedings
is intended to facilitate effective communication and the efficient resolution of issues."); THE
JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 26, at 19. For a suggestion from a German commentator that
disclosure can clear up the issues and help expedite the proceedings, see Bockemdhl, supra
note 36, at 73, and Schafer, supranote 39, at 205. For a common law perspective on the link
between early disclosure and efficiency, see, for example, Duff, supra note 149, at 156, 174;
Allard Ringnalda, ProceduralTradition and the Convergence of Criminal ProcedureSystems:
The Caseof the Investigation and Disclosureof Evidence in Scotland, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1133,
1151 (2014).
160. See, e.g., COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 (Il)(d); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-903(a)(3), 15A-908(b);
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(D); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(c).
161. See COLO. R. CRiM. P. 16 (III)(d); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-903(a)(3), 15A-908; TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(c); see also NYSBA Report, supranote 19, at 15-16. This
is somewhat different from the German regime, which vests the prosecutor with complete
discretion over such decisions during the investigative stage, at least in cases where the defendant is not detained.
162. See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(L)(2) ('The trial court specifically may regulate the time,
place, and manner of a pro se defendant's access to any discoverable material not to exceed
the scope of this rule."); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(d) (pro se defendants may
review but not copy materials in the file).
163. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 39(b)(10); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(C); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art 39.14(f).
164. StPO § 199.
165. See supra Part I.C.
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and at trial-to investigate independently the facts of the case
and to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. 66 By contrast, in the
United States, the prosecution discloses evidence only to the defense, and the court reviews evidence as part of the disclosure
process only when necessary to resolve disputes between the parties.'6 7 This process is consistent with the adversarial tradition-the
belief that the case is for the parties to develop, and the concern
that the court might be prejudiced by reviewing the evidence ahead
16 8
of trial.
Another contrast between the U.S. open-file discovery rules and
German rules on access to the file is that the former usually require
reciprocal disclosure from the defense, whereas the latter do not. In
both countries, the defendant's presumption of innocence, right to
remain silent, and attorney-client privilege constrain defense disclosure to some degree.' 69 But in the United States, recent reforms
have imposed greater disclosure obligations on both the defense
and the prosecution. 7 ° Defense disclosure is justified on the same
grounds as prosecutorial disclosure-that it promotes the search for
truth, renders the process fairer, and eliminates "trial by ambush."'' Although the trend toward reciprocal disclosure may
appear rather "inquisitorial," as noted earlier, it is actually peculiar
166. See StPO § 244(2) (noting the court's duty to establish the truth, if necessary, by
gathering additional evidence); supranotes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing the duty
to provide a fair hearing).
167. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
168. See infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text; see also Duff, supra note 149, at 154.
169. See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). But see United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225 (1975); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See generally Eric D. Blumenson,
ConstitutionalLimitationson ProsecutorialDiscovery, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 123 (1983);
Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the AdversarialBalance, 74 CALIF.
L. REV. 1567 (1986). For a discussion of similar restrictions on the ability of the state to gain
the cooperation of the accused in German criminal cases, see, for example, BGH [Federal
Court of Justice] NJW 2940 (2942), 1996 (discussing the "nemo tenetur" principle, under
which the state cannot force a defendant to cooperate in his own prosecution, and citing
authorities); Bockemiihl, supra note 36, at 90.
170. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-905 (2011). In Texas, however, the defense must only
disclose the names and addresses of testifying experts. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
39.14(b) (West 2015). See generally TEX. DEF. SERV. & TEX. APPLESEED, IMPROVING DIscovERY IN CRIMINAL CASES IN TEXAS: How BEST PRACTICES CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER JUSTICE
6, 15, 38 (2013), http://texasdefender.orgwp-contentluploads/tds-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JMC2-H5VA] (noting that, unlike Texas, almost all states require discovery from the defense).
171. Therese M. Myers, Note, Reciprocal Discovery Violations: Visiting the Sins of the Defense Lawyer on the Innocent Client, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1281 (1996).
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to common law jurisdictions. 7 2 Reciprocal disclosure reflects a conception of a criminal process as a contest between two opposing
sides, rather than one official inquiry into the truth.7 3
Discovery operates differently in Germany and the United States
for another reason as well-the file available to the parties before
plea bargaining is generally much less comprehensive in the United
States than in Germany. 1 4 This occurs for three principal reasons.
First, U.S. rules, unlike those that govern investigations in Germany, do not require police or prosecutors to investigate thoroughly
all material evidence before plea negotiations. 1 75 To the contrary,
early pleas are typically rewarded more generously precisely because they save valuable investigative resources.1 76 The reasoning
behind rewarding early pleas is that if a defendant is willing to
admit guilt, there is little point in expending time and effort to
investigate the details of the crime. The focus is on a speedy resolution of the case, rather than on the search for truth. Moreover,
because American police officers are not required to actively seek
out exculpatory evidence, investigations are more 77likely to present
1
a one-sided and incomplete picture of the events.
Second, U.S. police reports tend to be less detailed than German
police reports because of weak legal rules, a partisan organizational
172. Langer & Roach, supra note 94, at 278.
173. See id.
174. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 7 (manuscript at 54) (survey finding that even in
open-file jurisdictions, defense attorneys frequently express concern about the completeness
of the file they receive as part of pre-plea discovery); see also Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the
Facts, Ma'am": Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1, 18 (1993) ("With the exception of very serious or unusual cases, many defendants enter negotiated guilty pleas on the basis of inadequately developed accounts of the
relevant facts.").
175. See Fisher, supranote 174, at 38-39.
176. See Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea BargainingFifty Years
After Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 407, 408 & n.6 (2014); See also 2
CHRISTOPHER A.W. BENTLEY, CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 45:12 (2000) (discussing timing
in plea bargaining).
177. See, e.g., People v. Hayes, 950 N.E.2d 118, 122 (N.Y. 2011); see also Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979); United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 2007);
United States v. Martinez-Mercado, 888 F.2d 1484, 1488 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[B]ecause Brady
and its progeny only serve to restrict the prosecution's ability to suppress evidence rather
than to provide the accused a right to criminal discovery," the Brady rule does not "displace
the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered." (quoting United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985))).
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culture, and poor structural incentives. 78 No statutes or procedural

rules require U.S. police reports to include the results of every
investigative measure taken.179 Department policies at times include
provisions demanding that reports be comprehensive,' 8 but these
policies are typically vague and are not judicially enforceable."8 '
Comprehensive report policies also stand in tension with other
messages conveyed to officers through training, office culture, and
resource allocation. Training materials emphasize the importance
of including essential facts in police reports, but at the same time
encourage officers to be concise and suggest that details that are not
directly relevant to the case should be omitted.8 2 Likewise, some
department policies urge officers to write down "approximations" of
witness statements, which undermines the thoroughness and accuracy of the report.' 3 Finally, report forms usually provide templates
for basic descriptions of the persons and items involved in the in8 4 The
cident, but the gist of the report is in free-form narrative."
discretion left to officers with respect to the narrative section leads
to inconsistent approaches with respect to the level of detail includ85
ed. 1
Incident reports also reflect the partisan culture and resource
constraints of our police departments. As a general rule, department
178. See BOYNE, supra note 48, at 4-5; FEENEY & HERRMANN, supra note 25, at 356-57; cf.
Fisher, supra note 174, at 6-16; Symposium, New Perspectiveson Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations:Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices,31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 197477 (2010) [hereinafter New Perspectiveson Brady].
179. See Fisher, supra note 174, at 5-6, 7-8.
180. For two rare examples of more thorough regulation of report writing, see ANAHEIM
POLICE DEP'T, POLICY MANUAL, POLICY 344, at 158 (2013), http://www.anaheim.net/document
Center/home/view/328 [https://perma.c/6U66-ESCH] (reports should be "sufficiently detailed
for their purpose and free from errors prior to submission" and "accurately reflect the identity
of the persons involved, all pertinent information seen, heard or assimilated by any other
sense, and any actions taken"); Minneapolis Police Dep't, Policy & ProcedureManual,§ 4-600
Specific Report Policiesand Procedures,MINNEAPOLISMN.GOV http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.
uslpolice/policy/mpdpolicy_4-600_4-600 [https://perma.cc/9BA5-TK9G] (last updated Sept. 17,
2013).
181. See Fisher, supra note 174, at 27-28.
182. See id. at 28.
183. See id. at 29.
184. See id. at 27-28.
185. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITI-

CAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES 22 (1985); Michael Bruckheim, Dealing with Witnesses
Duringa DUI Case, in WITNESS PREPARATION AND EXAMINATION FOR DUI PROCEEDINGS, As-

PATORE, 2012 WL 1670094 (2012).
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policies do not require officers to include exculpatory evidence
(either as a general category or as a specific listing such as "alibi")
in their reports." 6 Training materials likewise emphasize the importance of writing the report in a way that protects it from subsequent
challenges by the defense, further discouraging the recording of
facts that might favor an alternative explanation of the crime."8 7
Finally, resource constraints, and particularly the "severe time
pressure to respond to calls," leaves officers with "little time to investigate or to write reports," especially in busy metropolitan
departments. 8 Police departments tend to focus on clearing cases
through
arrests and not on investigations to build up the case for
89
trial.
A third reason why the file that is disclosed to the defense might be
incomplete in U.S. jurisdictions is the lack of adequate procedures
186. See Fisher, supra note 174, at 28; see also TIMOTHY P. MARTA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INST., POLICEREPORTING (2004), http://www.cji.edulsite/assets/files/1921/police-reporting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C2SW-K3GF].
187. See Fisher, supranote 174, at 30-31. Some practitioners and commentators worry that
the tendency of officers to summarize and omit details in the narrative section of the report
would increase as states adopt open-file discovery. They argue that open-file may discourage
police officers from recording some of the investigative steps they take or information that
they gather, in order to avoid defense scrutiny of their work methods. See Turner & Redlich,
supra note 7 (manuscript at 50) (noting that some Virginia prosecutors surveyed viewed this
as a major disadvantage of open-file policies); cf. Brown, supra note 6, at 1623 n. 139 (noting
that rules requiring the state to turn over statements of persons with relevant information
to the case, even if those persons would not testify at trial, could discourage police from investigating fully: "If police know all people they speak to will be disclosed to the defense, they
may selectively investigate, seeking only witnesses they suspect have incriminating evidence,
or stopping after they have some incriminating witnesses to avoid the risk of discoveryconflicting ones"). Others, however, believe that regular defense scrutiny of the reports would
encourage more thorough reporting. See, e.g., Fran Hart, 10 Steps to Improve Your Written
Reports, POLICEONE.COM (Oct. 19, 2000), http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/44385Ten-Steps-to-Improve-Your-Written-Reports [https://perma.cc/24Q6-DYXW] ('In the early
eighties, a number of officers decided that their reports were going to be short and to the
point, eliminating as much detail as possible. They were convinced that if they wrote less,
they were less likely to be challenged in court on various points or to have their actions twisted by a clever defense attorney. They were wrong!").
188. Fisher, supra note 174, at 8; see id. at 20-21; see also James Schnabl, Reinventing
the Police Report for the 21st Century: Are Video Police Reports the Answer?, POLICE CHIEF
(Sept. 2012), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=isplay-arch
&article_id=2757&issue_id=92012 [https://perma.ccV932-4DTR].
189. See Fisher, supra note 174, at 8, 20-21; see also BRUCE FREDERICK & DON STEMEN,
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL
DECISION MAKING-TECHNICAL REPORT 62-63 (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/
grants/240334.pdf [https://perma.cc424M-EUEH].

1584

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1549

to ensure that relevant evidence is promptly and consistently transmitted to the prosecution. 9 ° Within police departments, certain
types of material, such as the investigatory notes or internal memos,
may not be passed along to the prosecutor at all, under the theory
that the police report contains all information that is necessary to
" ' Other evidence is conveyed with considerable delay.'9 2
the case. 19
Particularly when numerous agencies are involved in the investigation of a case, prosecutors have difficulty collecting information
from all relevant agencies in a timely fashion.'9 3 As a result of these
various gaps and delays in the transmission of evidence to the prosecution, the file available to the defense before negotiations may not
fully reflect the facts of the case.1 94
Finally, discovery in the United States not only reveals less about
the case, but it also can be entirely waived by the defense as part
of a plea deal. In contrast to German law, U.S. law tolerates the negotiation of a broad variety of waivers that are not inherent in guilty
pleas, such as waivers of civil rights remedies, the right not to be
placed in double jeopardy, the right to effective counsel, and the
right to discovery.' 9 5 Studies have shown that in some U.S. jurisdictions, the parties frequently bargain for waivers of discovery
rights.1 9 6 This is true in jurisdictions with restrictive discovery,
such as the federal system and that in New York, as well as in some
open-file jurisdictions, such as Texas.' 97
190. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, OrganizationalGuidelines for the Prosecutor'sOffice, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2093 (2010); Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor'sEthical Duty to Seek
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379,
1415-16 (2000); Meyn, supra note 1, at 1093.
191. See Fisher, supra note 174, at 37-38; Meyn, supra note 1, at 1093.
192. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 19, at 68-72. See generally Turner & Redlich, supra
note 7.
193. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 19, at 68-72. Because of the effort involved, prosecutors often postpone checking up on relevant information until after negotiations have
failed and the case is headed to trial. Id.
194. See, e.g., Turner & Redlich, supra note 7 (manuscript at 55).
195. See, e.g., TURNER, supra note 119, at 35-36; Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73
(2015); Slobogin, supra note 137.
196. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 19, at 66; Klein et al., supra note 195, at 83-85.
197. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 19, at 66; Klein et al., supra note 195, at 83-85; TEX.
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS Ass'N & MANAGING TO EXCELLENCE CORP., THE COST OF COMPLIANCE:
A LOOKAT THE FISCAL IMPACT AND PROCESS CHANGES OF THE MICHAEL MORTON ACT 24 (2015),

http://www.tcdla.com/Images/TCDLA/%20Temporary%20art/MMA%2OFinal%20Report.pdf
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IV. OPEN-FILE DISCOVERY AND BEYOND: COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS
What insights does the comparison between the German and U.S.
models of pre-plea discovery offer for policymakers? At the most
general level, the German experience provides an additional data
point for the proposition that broad disclosure is essential to ensuring fair and accurate dispositions in criminal cases. German defense
attorneys describe access to the investigative file as one of the most
critical defense rights at the pretrial stage-whether to prepare
them for plea negotiations or for trial."9 Courts also underscore that
the right to access the file is critical to guaranteeing fair proceedings.'9 9 The German approach suggests that open-file disclosure can
occur before plea negotiations without serious risks to witnesses or
undue burdens on criminal justice resources.
With respect to witness protection, the German experience suggests that courts and prosecutors can ensure the safety of witnesses
by imposing measures on a case-by-case basis, while retaining a
general rule of open-file disclosure. German practitioners, including
prosecutors, do not view witness safety as a significant problem that
needs to be addressed through broad restriction of disclosure." 0 It
is possible that the lower violent crime rate explains the lack of
concern, at least to some degree. The intentional homicide rate in
Germany is roughly six times lower than that in the United States,
and the rate of major assaults is roughly 60 percent lower than the
U.S. rate.20 ' Moreover, gang violence does not appear to be as
[https://perma.c/55KW-ND7S]. By contrast, discovery waivers are reported to be extremely
rare in Virginia (a state with restrictive discovery rules) and in North Carolina (a state with
open-file discovery). Turner & Redlich, supra note 7 (manuscript at 7).
198. See SOMMER, supra note 49, at 139; Bockemiihl, supra note 36, at 70.
199. See, e.g., BVerfGE 18, 399, 404; BVerfG NJW 3219 (3220), 1994; BVerfG, Beschluss
vom 12.01.1983-2 BvR 864/81, NStZ 273, 1983.
200. This perception was shared by the three prosecutors and three defense attorneys
whom I interviewed, and is confirmed by the lack of discussion of this problem in legal
literature. See Interview with Prosecutors, supra note 21, at 2-3; Interview with Sommer &
Tharra, supra note 58; Interview with Wblky, supra note 70.
201. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME [UNODC], TENTH UNITED NATIONS SURVEY OF CRIME
TRENDS AND OPERATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, COVERING THE PERIOD 2005-2006

(2008), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PA5J-F6EF]. For the data on Germany, see UNODC, GERMANY 2005-2006, at 729,
730-31 (2008), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Germany.pdf [https://
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prevalent in Germany as it does in the United States." 2 If, as a
result of these lower rates of gang-related violent crime, German
prosecutors encounter fewer cases in which they must consider
protective measures to compensate for liberal discovery, then they
are less likely to worry about the cost and effectiveness of such
measures (or of open-file discovery).
While differences in crime rates may offer part of the explanation,
existing mechanisms for protecting witnesses in individual cases
have also helped ward off potential dangers.20 3 These mechanisms
include withholding of witness addresses, and in exceptional cases,
witness names;... providing only limited disclosure to self-represented defendants;2 0 5 imposing conditions on defense attorneys' ability to communicate information from the file to their clients when
doing so might endanger a witness;2 6 prosecuting defendants or
others for tampering with witnesses when necessary;2 7 using detention to keep potentially dangerous defendants incapacitated; 20 89 and
2
relying on police-administered witness protection programs.
Similar protective measures are either already available, or can
be made available, in open-file jurisdictions in the United States,
perma.cc/9XPY-G6T2] (reporting a homicide rate of 0.94 and a major assault rate of 178 per
100,000-person population in 2005). For the data on the United States, see UNODC, UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 2005-2006, at 2277, 2278-79 (2008), http://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/USA.pdf [https:/Hperma.cc/2YKE-Z5CD] (reporting a homicide rate of 5.58
and a major assault rate of 287.55 per 100,000-person population in 2005). On the difficulty
of comparing European and U.S. crime rates, see Ineke Haen Marshall, How Exceptional Is
the United States? Crime Trends in Europe and the US, 4 EUR. J. CRIM. POLY & RES. 7, 8-10
(1996).
202. See Scott H. Decker & David C. Pyrooz, Gang Violence Worldwide: Context, Culture,
and Country, in SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2010: GANGS, GROUPS, AND GUNS 129, 136-37 (2010),
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2010/en/Small-Arms-Survey2010-Chapter-05-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW9Y-C73C]; Malcolm W. Klein et al., Street Gang
Violence in Europe, 3 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 413, 422 (2006).
203. Interview with Prosecutors, supra note 21, at 1.
204. See supra notes 50, 61 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
207. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 258, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.
de/englisclstgb/germanscriminal-code.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ5Y-86V6].
208. See StPO § 112.
209. See Johan Peter Wilhelm Hilger, Organized Crime/Witness Protection in Germany,
58 UNAFEI RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES 99, 99 (2001), http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/
RSNo58INo58_12VE_Hlger3.pdf [https://perma.ccZSD9-KGMS]; Interview with Prosecutors, supra note 21, at 2.
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and they can help accommodate concerns about the integrity of
investigations and witness safety. 210 In certain violent crime cases
(particularly those involving organized crime), more than one type
of protective measure may be necessary. If prosecutors must request
protective measures on a regular basis in certain types of cases, the
cost of litigating and imposing them may become so high as to
prompt jurisdictions to reconsider the presumption in favor of full
disclosure. Further empirical study is needed to understand the cost
and effectiveness of different witness safety measures in these circumstances. But in the vast majority of cases, which tend not to
raise concerns about witness intimidation, U.S. jurisdictions can
follow the German model of allowing open-file discovery, while
providing for court-imposed protective measures on a case-by-case
basis.
Some may also worry, particularly in an adversarial system like
ours, that open-file discovery may lead to "defense abuses" other
than the intimidation of witnesses-for example, the fabrication
of defenses based on the evidence disclosed.2 1 ' As one American
prosecutor lamented, open-file rules lead to "[m]isuse by defense
attorneys who twist the information they receive, and misrepresent
the law to the court, and use the information in a way that is not
supported by statute or case law to impeach witnesses."2 1' 2 Under
this view, generous disclosure succeeds in Germany because defense
attorneys are generally more passive and have a duty to be truthful
as "organs of the administration of justice"; as a result, they are less
likely to distort the evidence.2 1 Yet there is no evidence that U.S.
defense attorneys misuse evidence more frequently in jurisdictions

210. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text; see also NYSBA REPORT, supra note
19, at 15-21.
211. At least some U.S. prosecutors see the possibility of such defense abuse as one of the
major disadvantages of open-file discovery. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 7 (manuscript
at 14) (noting such concerns among Virginia prosecutors).
212. Id. (manuscript at 48) (footnote omitted).
213. For a discussion of German attorneys' duties as "organs" of justice, see, for example,
JOACHIM KRETSCHMER, DER STRAFRECHTLICHE PARTEIVERRAT 76 (2005) (citing to court
decisions making the connection between the duty as Organ der Rechtspflege and the duty to
the truth); Wilhelm Krekeler, Strafrechtliche Grenzen der Verteidigung,4 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr
FOR STRAFRECHT (NStZ) 146, 152 (1989); Gerd Pfeiffer, Zuldssiges und Unzulassiges Verteidigerhandeln,9 DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG (DiRZ) 341 (1984).
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that have adopted open-file discovery than in those that have not. 214
More broadly, it is not clear that U.S. defense attorneys today are
significantly more aggressive than their German counterparts.
Whereas German courts and scholars are increasingly concerned
about the rise of "conflict defense" in Germany, American commentators worry about underfunded, overwhelmed, and insufficiently
zealous lawyers in the United States.2 15 It is thus unlikely that
defense attorney behavior can fully explain or justify the different
approaches to disclosure in Germany and the United States.
Still, German disclosure rules remain heavily influenced by the
inquisitorial tradition, and this limits the extent to which U.S.
jurisdictions could or should emulate these rules. For example, the
success of the German model of discovery depends to a great degree
on judicial review of the investigative file. Judges review the file
before confirming the charges, which encourages the police and
prosecution to be more thorough in their pretrial investigation.
Judges' ability to review the evidence once the indictment is filed
also allows them to play an active role in plea negotiations and to
ensure that any negotiated judgment reflects the facts of the case.
These functions are fully consistent with the inquisitorial tradition,
under which judges have the duty to investigate the facts independently. Also consistent with this tradition is the relative lack of
concern that judges might be prejudiced by reading the file or taking
part in plea negotiations. By virtue of their training and professional expectations, judges are presumed to be independent and
dispassionate. Although commentators are increasingly questioning
this presumption, it remains widely held and explains Germany's
willingness to entrust judges with reviewing the file and participating in plea negotiations.
In the United States, many of the conditions that allow judges to
be active in German criminal cases are absent. Because of our historical skepticism of domineering judges, we tend to worry more
214. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 7 (manuscript at 48) (finding that North Carolina
prosecutors, who are required to provide open-fie discovery, do not see defense misuse as a
serious problem).
215. For a discussion of conflict defense in Germany, see, for example, Michael Bohlander,
A Silly Question? CourtSanctions Against Defence Counselfor TrialMisconduct, 10 CRIM. L.F.
467, 470-71 (1999). For a discussion of defense attorney behavior in the United States, see,
for example, Brown, supra note 6, at 1590.
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about entrusting the court with an active role in managing discovery or participating in plea negotiations.21 6 Judges are often elected
and lack specialized judicial training before assuming the bench,
which raises additional concerns about their ability to remain impartial. Not surprisingly, a number of courts and commentators
predict a higher likelihood of coercion and bias if judges were to
review evidence before trial and become involved in negotiations.2 17
As a result of these entrenched attitudes, some U.S. judges themselves are likely to resist a more active role in discovery and plea
bargaining, even if they were permitted to assume such a role under
the law.2 1 This is especially likely to the extent that greater judicial
involvement of the kind described here-reviewing all the evidence
disclosed to ensure that plea bargains are fair and truthful-would
slow down the disposition of cases. Because of our limited judicial
resources, the pressure to process cases is significant, and any procedure that stands in the way would face at least some resistance.2 1 9

216. Yet at least when it comes to civil cases, this attitude has not prevented the rise of
"managerial" judges who actively supervise both pretrial discovery and settlement discussions. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-80 (1982) (describing
how, despite traditional resistance to judicial activism, federal judges assumed a more managerial role in civil cases, in response to changes in civil procedure rules and a burgeoning
caseload).
217. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1974 amendment (citing
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)); Richard
Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea BargainingProcess, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1349, 1351-52 (2004).
218. Judges are keen to engage in this role when they believe it will expedite the proceedings. But it is unclear whether many would be willing to devote additional time to
reviewing discovery and investigating facts during plea negotiations or hearings in order to
ensure more truthful and fair dispositions. For a discussion of the disagreement among
practitioners as to whether judges involved in plea negotiations are mainly focused on disposing of cases or on reaching a fairer and more informed disposition, see Turner, supranote 125,
at 253-54. For evidence that at least some judges get involved in plea negotiations primarily
to obtain "more complete information to render an adequate sentence," see Allen F. Anderson,
Judicial Participationin the Plea Negotiation Process: Some Frequencies and Disposing
Factors,10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 39, 46 (1989).
219. See Darryl K. Brown, Defense Counsel, TrialJudges, and Evidence ProductionProtocols, 45 TEX. TECH L. REv. 133, 144-45 (2012) ("Thorough evidence preparation often, though
not always, takes more time, which could delay dispositions. While the policy choice for reliable adjudication over speedy adjudication should be easy in theory, in reality judges often
face significant pressure to move their dockets efficiently. Judges, after all, are monitored by
their own principals for whom docket backlogs may be salient: chief judges, legislatures (who
may control reappointment), or even electorates (who also may).").
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These concerns about the feasibility of judicial intervention in an
adversarial system are valid, at least to some degree. But it is important not to overstate the risks of greater court involvement and
to recognize the benefits it offers. Consider first the argument that
judges would be unduly prejudiced if they reviewed the evidence
disclosed between the parties. Judges already regularly review
substantial portions of the evidence in order to rule on pretrial motions (including discovery motions), yet they are not subsequently
recused from presiding over plea colloquies or trials. There is no reason to believe that reviewing the entire set of discovery materials
would prejudice them any more. In fact, the danger of prejudice is
in some respects less serious in our system of reciprocal discovery
than it is in Germany. Here, disclosure to the court would include
evidence produced by both parties, which would reduce the risk that
the court would see a one-sided version of the facts. Concerns related to participation in plea negotiations could also be alleviated by
providing that judges who participate in any failed negotiations are
then to be disqualified from presiding over a subsequent trial, as
already occurs in some U.S. jurisdictions.2 2 °
More importantly, judicial review of the evidence before plea
negotiations could offer distinct benefits that are currently missing
from the American system. Judicial scrutiny of the file could encourage more thorough pre-plea investigation by police and prosecutors.
Providing the court with disclosure would also allow it to make a
more informed decision on the validity of guilty pleas. The rules
already require judges to review the factual basis of a guilty plea,
and reviewing the disclosed evidence would help judges do so more
accurately. In jurisdictions that permit judicial involvement in plea
negotiations, disclosure to the court would also facilitate a more informed and more neutral assessment of the fairness and accuracy
of any plea bargains discussed by the parties.2 2 1 These benefits may
be significant enough for at least some U.S. jurisdictions to consider
220. See, e.g., State v. Revelo, 775 A.2d 260, 268 (Conn. 2001); State v. D'Antonio, 830 A.2d
1187, 1194 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); see also Turner, supra note 125, at 263.
221. See generally Turner, supra note 125 (discussing the benefits of judicial participation
and measures that can be taken to mitigate potential downsides of such participation). See
also Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent PeoplePlead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BooKs (Nov. 20,2014), http:H
2
20
www.nybooks.comarticles/archives/ 014/nov/ /why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https:I/
perma.cc/5TXR-BLB6].
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investing the resources needed to allow such judicial involvement to
succeed.
Even if disclosure to the court is seen as too costly and too foreign
to be implemented in the near future, the German model may offer
more promising leads in other respects. Specifically, it underscores
the importance of regulating investigations in order to ensure that
open-file disclosure works effectively. Disclosure in Germany is
valuable to the parties and to the court because police are required
to record each investigative step undertaken and transmit the file
containing these records to the prosecution without delay. German
scholars and legal practitioners recognize the importance of such
regulations and have argued for strengthening the demands on the
police to keep records of investigations and to audiotape or videotape interrogations and witness interviews.2 2 2 Similar proposals to
regulate more closely the documentation of evidence and its transmission to the prosecution are already emerging independently in
certain U.S. jurisdictions. The German experience offers additional
endorsement for them.
First, American police departments can do more to regulate the
documentation of investigations and the transmission of all relevant
evidence to the prosecution. The increasing adoption of rules and
policies requiring interrogations, interviews, and police encounters
to be videotaped is a promising step in this direction.2 2 3 Another positive reform, already enacted by some American police departments,
has been to create specific headings for evidence in police reports,
thereby making the reports more comprehensive.2 2 4 Along the same
lines, at least one police department has revised its report forms to
include a specific category for exculpatory evidence, in order to

222. See Thomas Weigend, Strafprozessreform und Rechtsprechung,in DEUTSCHE STRAFPROZESSREFORM UND EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE (Matthias Jahn & Henning Radtke eds.,
forthcoming 2016).
223. See LINDSAY MILLER ET AL., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A
BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 1 (2014) http://
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/472014912134715246869.pdf [https://perma.ccfU2CT-D3
X2]; Schnabl, supra note 188; Andrew E. Taslitz, High Expectations and Some Wounded
Hopes: The Policy and Politicsof a Uniform Statute on Videotaping CustodialInterrogations,
7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 400, 409 (2012) (acknowledging trend but adding that "the vast
majority of police departments still do not record all interrogations").
224. See MARTA, supra note 186, at 9, 15.
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encourage a more balanced recording of the facts. 22 5 Departments
could go even further and adopt rules that specifically require
officers to document each investigative measure they take, rather
than merely demanding that reports be comprehensive (as current
department policies tend to do). An Illinois commission that was
created to propose reforms of the criminal process in order to reduce
miscarriages of justice recommended that police "keep schedules
provide copies of the schedules
listing all relevant evidence and ...
to the prosecutor. '2 26 With advances in technology, electronic forms
and checklists could arguably make such documentation feasible for
even the busiest metropolitan police departments. Such concrete reforms could help police departments overcome ingrained adversarial
habits and move closer to the German practice of ensuring complete
and accurate recording of investigative steps.
Likewise, American legislatures, prosecutors, and police departments could promulgate rules and policies that require officers to
convey the complete record of the investigation to prosecutors. U.S.
commentators have already remarked upon the need to improve
procedures, training, and the use of technology "to ensure that all
information generated by a police agency is preserved and provided
to prosecutors promptly when requested. '22 7 Two more concrete
steps that have been recommended include checklists and software
prompts which would remind officers what information needs to be
transmitted, allowing supervisors, prosecutors, and courts to verify
the completeness of the file.22
The German model suggests another policy that could help
produce more comprehensive files for the parties to use in plea
bargaining: encouraging more complete investigations before plea
negotiations occur. U.S. commentators have discussed the perils of
"meet 'em and greet 'em" pleas, mostly as an ethical problem for the
225. See Fisher, supra note 174, at 28 (mentioning the Atlanta Police Department as the
only department in his study that specifically called for the inclusion of exculpatory facts in
police reports).
226. Susan S. Kuo & C.W. Taylor, In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for illinois Disclosure, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 695, 710 (2007) (citing ILL. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

19,

Recommendation 2 (2002)).
227. NYSBA REPORT, supranote 19, at 73.
228. See, e.g., New Perspectiveson Brady, supra note 178, at 1974; see also Baer, supranote
4, at 62; Brown, supra note 219, at 146-47, 147 n.85; Fisher, supra note 174, at 50.
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defense .2 9 But early plea negotiations, which allow prosecutors to
dispose of cases on a thin factual basis, could be equally problematic.
To avoid poorly informed dispositions, chief prosecutors could set
office guidelines encouraging more thorough investigations before
plea negotiations. These guidelines would operate only internally,
as American prosecutors-unlike their German counterparts-have
no supervisory authority over the police.23 ° While U.S. prosecutors
could not order police officers to conduct full investigations at an
earlier point in time, they could use informal and indirect means to
nudge officers to give them more developed files before initial
charges are filed.23 1 Where this process is insufficient, prosecutors
could also rely on their own investigators to conduct additional fact
collection before negotiations.23 2
Another feature of the German investigative framework-the
duty of the prosecution to gather all relevant evidence-would be
too inimical to our adversarial model to succeed. In Germany, the
duty to gather exculpatory evidence has the benefit of making investigations more objective and directing state resources on behalf
of defendants (which is critical for defendants who lack the funding
to investigate on their own). This arrangement leads most German
defense attorneys to remain passive during the pretrial stage and
to rely primarily on state authorities to gather evidence. This is not
a feature that American jurisdictions would wish to import.2 33 Even
in Germany, practice manuals caution defense attorneys about the
cognitive biases of state authorities and about the likelihood that
229. E.g., Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, TriagingAppointed-Counsel Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 975 (2012); Geri L. Dreiling, 'Meet-andGreet'PleasNot Good Enough:PublicDefender in FloridaBans Long-Standing Practice,ABA
J. EREPORT, June 24, 2005; Erica J. Hashimoto, The Priceof MisdemeanorRepresentation, 49
WM. & MARY L. REv. 461, 473-74 (2007).
230. See New Perspectiveson Brady, supra note 178, at 2023.
231. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/BargainingTradeoff, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 32 n.9, 63, 65 (2002); see also New Perspectives on Brady, supranote 178, at 1973.
Because our system of prosecution is decentralized, such relationships between prosecution
and police have to be forged jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction and office-by-office.
232. See Wright & Miller, supra note 231, at 63, 65.
233. As noted earlier, criminal defense in the United States has already lost much of its
potency as a result of severe funding cuts and other practical and legal constraints. See, e.g.,
Brown, supra note 6, at 1590. But open-file discovery should not be used as an excuse to
entrench such underfunding. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
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police and prosecutors would not recognize and seek out exculpatory
evidence.2 34 A few defense attorneys have taken this advice seriously
and have begun to investigate cases on their own before trial. But
in most cases, entrenched attitudes, practical constraints, and even
certain legal rules continue to inhibit independent defense investigation.5
A rule requiring police to seek out exculpatory evidence is not
likely to succeed in the United States. As an initial point, the
adversarial conception of having two lines of investigation remains
strong and would likely prevent the rule's adoption.2 36 Our courts
have consistently rejected the idea that police have a legal duty to
seek out evidence favorable to the defense, instead emphasizing the
duty of counsel to investigate adequately.2 3 7
Even if such a rule were to be adopted, it likely would not be
effective, unless accompanied by a more fundamental change in
police culture. As the recent experiences of England and Scotland
suggest, the tradition of partisan evidence-gathering is too deeply
rooted to be displaced by a formal rule that police should seek out
exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence.23 Police officers in adversarial systems have difficulty abandoning the "us against them"
234. See SOMMER, supranote 49, at 32-39, 88-89. Others recommend defense investigations
at the pretrial stage as a necessity to avoid unpleasant surprises at trial. See Bockemuhl,
supra note 36, at 75-76.
235. See Bockemiil, supranote 36, at 76; Weigend & Salditt, supra note 46, at 91.
236. See ILL. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 20 (2002) (proposing that Illinois adopt a duty for police
"to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry"); Kuo & Taylor, supra note 226, at 710 & n.93
(noting that the legislature failed to adopt the recommendation of the Illinois Governor's
Commission for police to pursue exculpatory evidence); see also Fisher, supra note 190, at
1399-1401, 1415-20 (noting the uncertain effects of the English rule requiring police to seek
exculpatory evidence and discussing the improbability of a similar rule being adopted in the
United States).
237. On the lack of a duty by the police to investigate evidence favorable to the defense, see
Langer & Roach, supra note 94. On the duty of counsel to investigate, see, for example, Foust
v. Houk, 655 F.3d 524, 537-38 (6th Cir. 2011); Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 646-47 (9th Cir.
2009). For a discussion of the Brady due diligence rule, which provides that the state need
not disclose evidence that the defense could have obtained through reasonable effort, see 6
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3(b), at 1105 (3d ed. 2000); Thea
Johnson, What You Should Have Known Can Hurt You: Knowledge, Access, and Brady in the
Balance, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3 (2015); Kate Weisburd, ProsecutorsHide, Defendants
Seek: The Erosion of Brady Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138,
138 (2012).
238. See Quirk, supra note 10, at 49; Ringnalda, supra note 159, at 1155, 1160.
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mentality that has long characterized their function in the criminal
process.23 9 As a result, they frequently fail to recognize exculpatory
evidence altogether, and even when they do recognize it, they resist
the notion that it is their responsibility to collect it and provide it to
the defense.2 4
Finally, the adoption of a rule that charges the state with gathering exculpatory evidence may have perverse effects for the defense.
It may discourage some defense attorneys from investigating cases
proactively. Moreover, it may be used as an excuse for insufficient
funding of defense investigations on the theory that such investigations are no longer
needed once the state gathers evidence on the
2 41
behalf.
defense's
In short, certain features of the German investigative modelthose emphasizing more thorough investigation before plea negotiations and more comprehensive documentation-could be beneficial
to U.S. jurisdictions that wish to reap the full potential of open-file
discovery. Other procedures-such as those imposing a duty on
police and prosecutors to gather exculpatory evidence-are simply
too foreign to our adversarial tradition to succeed.
CONCLUSION

The fact that more U.S. jurisdictions are adopting open-file discovery rules reflects a growing consensus among adversarial and
inquisitorial systems about the importance of broad disclosure in
criminal cases. As our model aligns more closely with foreign approaches to disclosure, comparative analysis becomes more relevant
and useful.
239. See Quirk, supra note 10, at 48 (quoting a sergeant as saying: "[W]e're salesmen for
jail ... it's us against them").
240. See id. at 47-48; see also PETER HENRY GROSS, REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 56 (2011), https://www.judiciary.gov.uklwp-contentluploads/JCODocuments/
Reports/disclosure-review-september-201 1.pdf [https://perma.ccfNBP8-GM5P] (reporting that
U.S. federal prosecutors, in interviews by the report's contributors, expressed the following
concerns about the imposition of a duty to seek out exculpatory evidence: "[N]ot only would
there be serious resource implications for prosecutors but this would be a difficult task for
prosecutors to undertake, given the absence of any requirement for a defence case statement.
In any event, if put more colloquially-as it was to us-the prosecution was not there to do
the job of the defence").
241. See Duff, supranote 149, at 176; Ringnalda, supra note 159, at 1153-54.
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A review of German rules on disclosure offers three concrete insights about the design of disclosure rules, and one broader point
about the regulation of discovery and plea bargaining. First, the
comparison shows that thorough and well-documented investigations are critical to making pre-plea discovery more effective.
Second, it suggests that disclosure to the court could provide a
helpful complement to open-file discovery. Such disclosure allows
judges to monitor the factual basis and fairness of plea bargains and
guilty pleas, and to intervene when necessary to prevent unjust outcomes. The German model also indicates that protective measures
can be used in individual cases to minimize the risk that disclosure
would endanger witnesses.
More generally, comparative review underscores that open-file
discovery is just one element of a broader framework regulating plea
bargaining. Other criminal procedure rules combine with discovery
rights to ensure fair and accurate guilty pleas. German law regulates plea bargains more closely than U.S. law in several significant
ways. It requires that plea negotiations occur after investigations
are complete. It limits plea discounts and charge bargains. And it
prohibits negotiated waivers and demands a more probing review of
the admission of guilt. These requirements all work together with
open-file discovery to reduce the risk of coercive and truth-distorting
plea bargains, although they also undoubtedly reduce the efficiency
of plea bargaining to some degree.
Analysis of the German system offers some general ideas on
regulating discovery and plea bargaining that could be of interest to
U.S. scholars and policymakers, even if many of Germany's specific
criminal procedures may not fit well within the American adversarial tradition. Differences in procedural traditions, organizational
cultures, judicial resources, and crime rates all limit the extent to
which particular procedural schemes from one system could be
imported to the other. Yet careful comparison, attentive to the
distinct social and legal contexts of each criminal justice system,
could identify discrete areas in which the German experience offers
useful guidance to American legal audiences. As U.S. jurisdictions
increasingly discuss and implement rules on disclosure and plea
bargaining that are similar to Germany's rules, such comparison
becomes ever more relevant.
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CHRISTOPHERD. BYRNE, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S.
Head of Research and
Instructional Services and
Adjunct Professor of Law
STEPHEN P. CARNEY, B.S., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
HONORABLE MARK C. CHRISTIE, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
TIMOTHY G. CLANCY, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law

JUDITH M. CONTI, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law
CRESSONDRA B. CONYERS, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
CHERAN D. CORDELL, B.S., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
DARRYL W. CUNNINGHAM, B.S., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
MARC E. DARNELL, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
LEAH DAVENPORT, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
FREDERICK W. DINGLEDY, B.S., M.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
CLAIBORNE REID FLINN, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
ANDREW R. Fox, B.A., M.S.ED., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
FREDERICK R. GERSON, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
HONORABLE JOHN ADRIAN GIBNEY, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
GREGORY A. GIORDANO, A.B., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
NATHAN R. GREEN, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
LESLIE A TAKACS HALEY, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, B.A.,
M.P.P., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
BENJAMIN L. HATCH, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
MICHAEL L. HEIKES, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
LOUANNA 0. HEUHSEN, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
GARY A. HICKS, B.S., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
FRED B. JACOB, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law
HONORABLE D. ARTHUR KELSEY, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law
DENISE W. KOCH, B.A., M.A., M.B.A.

Adjunct Professor of Law
HONORABLE DAVID W. LANNETTI, B.S.,
M.S., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
ANDREW P. LARSEN, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
JAMES C. LEWIS, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
CHADIA MANSOUR, B.A., M.A.

Adjunct Professor of Law
SHARON A. MARCiAL, B.S., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law
ALFRED O. MASTERS, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
FRANK T. MCCORMICK, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
HONORABLE TOMMY E. MILLER, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law

GARY A MILLS, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law
HELENA S. MOCK, B.A., M.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
TINA L. MOHR, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law
BRIAN G. MUSE, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law
MARK E. NEWCOMB, B.S., J.D., LL.M.
Adjunct Professor of Law
HONORABLE TOMMY K. NORMENT, JR.,
B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
HONORABLE DAVID J. NOVAK, B.S., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
CHRISTIAN A ORTEGO, B.A., M.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
ELLIOTT P. PARK, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
STEVEN R. PERLES, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
ROBERT J. POGGENKLASS, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
CHARLES E. POSTON, B.A., M.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
BRIAN A. PRISTERA, B.S., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
DANIEL R. QUARLES, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
DOUGLAS A. RAMSEUR, B.S., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
NEIL P. REIFF, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
CLIONA M. ROBB, B.A., M.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
JOSHUA I. ROSENSTEIN, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
WILLIAM L. ROWE, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
FAY A. ROZOVSKY, A.B., J.D., M.P.H.
Adjunct Professor of Law
MEGAN M. SCANLON, B.S., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
JEFFREY M. SCHLERF, B.A., M.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
JEFFREY E. SCHWARTZ, B.S., M.S., J.D.
Adjunct Professorof Law
JENNIFER E. SEKULA, B.S., M.S.E.L.,
J.D., M.S.L.S.
Head of Access Services, Foreignand
InternationalLaw Specialist, and
Adjunct Professorof Law
DAVID E. SELLA-VILLA, B.S., B.A.,
M.SC., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
HONORABLE WILLIAM H. SHAW HI,
B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
NICHOLAS F. SIMOPOULOS, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
PATRICK S. SLEBONICK, B.A, M.ED., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law

MATTHEW W. SMITH, B.S., M.A., J.D., PH.D.

DEBORAH C. WATERS, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
MICHtLE K. SPIKE, B.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law

K. MICHELLE WELCH, B.A., J.D.

DAVID H. SUMP, B.S., M.B.A., J.D.

ELIZABETH L. WHITE, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law
ANIELA K. SZYMANSKI, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law
JOHN TARLEY, JR., B.S., M.B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
HONORABLE WILFORD TAYLOR, JR.,

B.S., M.FIN., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law
GILBERT E. TEAL II, B.S., M.A., M.P.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law

Adjunct Professorof Law
Adjunct Professorof Law
Adjunct Professorof Law

CHRISTINE R. WILLIAMS, A.B., M.H.A.,

M.B.A., J.D.

Associate Directorfor Research,
Entrepreneurship& Professional
Education, CLCT, and Adjunct
Professorof Law
JOHN YOUNG, B.A., J.D., B.C.L.

Adjunct Professorof Law
HONORABLE J.R. ZEPKIN, B.A., J.D.

JASON B. TORCHINSKY, B.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professorof Law

Adjunct Professor of Law

HOWARD J. ZLOTNICK, B.A., J.D.

JOHN T. TUCKER, B.S., M.A., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law
MICHAEL J. WALKER, B.S., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law

Adjunct Professor of Law
MEGAN C. ZWISOHN, B.S., J.D.

Adjunct Professor of Law

